The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

• renewal of international education and cultural links; and

• institutional and administrative reform.

There were three additions to the October 2002 list:

• ensuring the military campaign was as swift and carefully targeted as possible;

• working with the UN and the international community to meet emergency

humanitarian needs; and

• enabling Iraqis “to establish their own democratic government as quickly as

possible” and encouraging UN involvement in the process.

724.  Mr Bowen commented on the draft on 4 March.316 He suggested that, in addition

to drawing on wording in the military campaign objectives, the draft could:

“… reflect more closely how we would wish post-Saddam Iraq to be governed … We

are also concerned about the extent to which the document implies responsibility for

Iraq’s future being largely the UK’s rather than that of the international community.”

725.  Specific recommendations included:

• replacing the reference to an “independent and democratic Iraq” with “an Iraq

with effective and representative government”; and

• extensive redrafting of the section on UK/Coalition support in order to distinguish

between the Coalition contribution “in the immediate wake of conflict” and what

“we” and the international community, working with the Iraqi people, would do

within months of the conflict.

726.  Mr Hoon endorsed Mr Bowen’s proposed redraft, commenting that “it would be

useful in terms of credibility to be able to set out our vision in the more specific text …

recognising that this may add to the challenge of reaching agreement with the US”.317

727.  Both sets of comments were copied to No.10.

728.  A revised version of the ‘Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People’ was sent to No.10 on

15 March, the day before the Azores Summit. It incorporated Mr Bowen’s proposal to

replace “democratic” with “effective and representative government”, but did not reflect

his broader recommendation for extensive redrafting.

729.  On 27 February, the British Embassy Washington reported that the US was

showing “growing acceptance” of the idea of a civilian administrator backed by a

UN mandate.

316 Letter Bowen to Owen, 4 March 2003, ‘Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People’.

317 Letter Williams to Owen, 5 March 2003, ‘A Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People’.

442