The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
593.
Dr Reid wrote
to Mr Blair on 9 March that, as a result of the latest Force
Level
Review,
troop levels would be reduced in May 2006, from approximately 8,000
to
594.
The reduction
had been made possible by the “completion of various
security
sector
reform tasks, a reduction in the support levels for those tasks,
and recent
efficiency
measures in theatre”.
595.
Dr Reid wrote
that he intended to announce the new force package in the
House
of Commons
on 13 March, and would make clear that “this is not a formal
handover
of security
responsibility” but would also “trail that the Joint
Iraqi/coalition assessment
phase to
look at future handover will begin shortly”.
596.
That would
leave the way clear for a statement by the Iraqi Prime Minister
on
security,
so enabling the UK to confirm its intention to hand over in
Muthanna and
Maysan in
May/June.
597.
Dr Reid told
DOP(I) on 9 March that the assessment of conditions in
Maysan
and Muthanna
would take place formally in April on a timetable that allowed
handover
to take
place in May.291
He observed
that emerging security problems might have an
impact on
this.
598.
On 10 March,
the JIC assessed the Islamist terrorist threat in the
UK.292
599.
The JIC
assessed that the conflict in Iraq fitted easily into the
jihadists’ “single
narrative”
that a Zionist-Christian alliance was waging a war against Islam
and that
Muslims
must therefore take up arms against this alliance and its
supporters, confirming
the belief
of extremists that Islam was under attack and needed to be defended
using
force. That
reinforced the determination of terrorists who were already
committed to
attacking
the West and motivated others who were not.
600.
The JIC judged
that:
“Iraq is
likely to be an important factor for some time to come in the
radicalisation of
British
Muslims and in motivating those extremists who view attacks against
the UK
as
legitimate.”
601.
Other
conflicts – such as Bosnia, Chechnya and Palestine – had served a
similar
purpose,
but the UK’s profile in Iraq and Afghanistan was much
higher.
602.
On 13 March,
Dr Reid made a statement in the House of Commons about
operations
and force levels in Iraq.293
He
announced that from May 2006 UK force levels
would
reduce to “just over 7,000”, a reduction of around 800
personnel.
290
Letter Reid
to Blair, 9 March 2006, ‘Iraq: Force Level Review and
Announcement’.
291
Minutes, 9
March 2006, DOP(I) meeting.
292
JIC
Assessment, 10 March 2006, ‘The Islamist Terrorist Threat in the
UK’.
293
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 13 March
2006, columns 1151-1153.
588