The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
394.
Draft press
lines stated that British lives were not being put at unnecessary
risk.
Service
personnel used:
“… the
vehicles most appropriate to the missions and tasks they are
undertaking.
If the
threat level increases, so do the protective and preventative
measures taken,
for example
by using Warrior Infantry Fighting vehicles.”
395.
The key
message was that British forces were:
“… equipped
with the most suitable and best protected vehicles for the job in
hand.
The
allocation of vehicles on Op TELIC is therefore constantly reviewed
in line with
the
currently assessed areas of highest risk and operational
priority.”
396.
Mr Ingram’s
Private Office recorded on 24 August that he had noted the
advice.198
397.
In late
August, in response to tasking from Lieutenant General Robin Brims,
who
had become
Senior British Military Representative‑Iraq in April, the DIS, PJHQ
and
MND(SE)
assessed Muqtada al‑Sadr’s strategy and future
intentions:
“Given past
casualties and the increasing sophistication of recent attacks,
we
expect such
action in the future to mainly consist of limited engagements,
standoff
attacks and
deniable operations including the use of technologically
advanced
Improvised
Explosive Devices (IED), (incorporating Passive Infra‑Red
sensors
(PIR),
Explosively Formed Projectiles (EFP), and Remote Controlled (RC)
arming),
of Lebanese
Hizballah/IRGC QF design. It is assessed such IED attacks are
not
being
directed by JAM as an organisation but it appears that certain Shia
extremists,
who may
also belong to JAM, are co‑operating with external actors to
conduct
398.
On 26 August,
Dr John Reid, who had become Defence Secretary in May,
was
provided
with advice from a junior official in the Directorate of Joint
Commitments about
how the MOD
intended to counter the threat posed by the PIR
IEDs.200
399.
The official
stated that technical work on a countermeasure was at an
“advanced
stage” and
that the UK should deploy a pre‑detonation capability
(M*201) to
Iraq as soon
as one was
technically available, subject to securing UOR funding. That was
expected
to be
around October 2005. The initial estimate of cost was
£35m.
400.
The official
also warned that PIR detonation was the insurgents’ response
to
existing
ECM and that it was likely that any UK response would be met with
further
adaptation
resulting in yet further ECM requirements.
198
Note
PS/Minister(AF) to PJHQ Hd Fin/Pol Ops 1, 24 August 2005, ‘Iraq:
Equipment – Follow‑up to
Minister(DP)’s
Visit report’.
199
Report [30
August 2005], ‘Muqtada Al‑Sadr’s Strategy and Future
Intentions’.
200
Minute DJC
[junior official] to PS/SofS [MOD], 26 August 2005, ‘Iraq:
Pre‑detonation of Passive Infra
Red
Initiated Roadside Bombs’.
201 A
cipher has replaced the name of this project for national security
reasons.
68