The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

536. President Chirac concluded that “talking direct was better than via TV and radio

broadcasts”. He had told Mr Blair that he did not want “disagreements over Iraq to have

an impact on the UK and France’s joint interests in Europe” and they should talk before

the European Council on 20 March.

537. Mr Blair “said that he too did not want things to become more difficult”. He “wanted

to ensure the strength of the UK/France relationship was not affected”.

538. Mr Campbell suggested that Mr Straw was “instructed” to “concede nothing”

when he spoke to Mr de Villepin.

539. Mr Campbell wrote that the discussion was “a lot friendlier than it might have been”

but President Chirac had been:

“… straight on to the point TB expected, namely he could see a way of co-operating

on the tests but it must be the inspectors who decide if Saddam is co-operating.

He said he could not support an ultimatum or anything taken as a support for

military action.

“TB said the problem with that was that it meant he could have as many last

chances and as much time as he [Saddam] wanted. There had to be automaticity

[trigger for attack].

“Chirac said there could not be automaticity.”179

540. Mr Campbell added that Mr Blair and President Chirac had agreed Mr Straw

and Mr de Villepin should talk, but Mr Blair “issued instructions” to Mr Straw

“to concede nothing. There was intelligence suggesting the French were seeking

to get the undecided six to go for tests plus more time.” Mr Blair suspected

President Chirac “would move to a position of automaticity but inspectors are the sole

judges of compliance”.

541. Asked whether the UK had been told by France that it was misrepresenting

President Chirac’s position, Mr Blair told the Inquiry that he had spoken to President

Chirac on 14 March and:

“The French position was very, very clear. It wasn’t that they would veto any

resolution, it is that they would veto a resolution that authorised force in the event

of breach.”180

542. Mr de Villepin stated that no country had shown any support for the UK

proposals.

179 Campbell A & Hagerty B. The Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power: Countdown

to Iraq. Hutchinson, 2012.

180 Public hearing, 29 January 2010, pages 124-125.

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