The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
see “a
surge of attacks as popular anti-MNF-I sentiment is inflamed” by
events unfolding
251.
The Chiefs of
Staff met on 20 October to prepare advice for Mr Hoon on a
potential
252.
The minutes
said that the Chiefs supported the deployment but
highlighted
the need
to plan for the possibility that the campaign would last longer
than 30 days.
Gen Walker
concluded the meeting by stating that “no decision had been made
but
that the
military advice would be to accede to the US request”.
253.
That advice
was submitted to Mr Hoon the same day.128
It described a
“clear
military
benefit” to the North Babil deployment and said that the Chiefs of
Staff
recommended
that the US request should be met. The expected length of the
operation
remained 30
days, but Mr Howard reminded Mr Hoon that Prime Minister Allawi
had
yet to
authorise the operation, and had some political difficulties to
resolve in doing so
which might
cause delay.
254.
Mr Michael
Howard, Leader of the Opposition, called on Mr Blair to clarify
the
proposed
Black Watch deployment at Prime Minister’s Questions on 20
October.129
Mr Blair
confirmed that no decision had yet been taken. He told the House of
Commons:
“A request
has been made. There is now a military assessment. The military
will
make a
recommendation and a final decision will be made.”
255.
Lt Gen McColl
concluded his tour in Iraq in October 2004 and was succeeded
by
Lieutenant
General John Kiszely.130
In his
“hauldown” report covering his six months
in Iraq Lt
Gen McColl wrote that the relationship between the CPA and the
military
had been
“hampered from the outset by inadequate post war planning” and by
close
supervision
and intervention by the Pentagon.
256.
Lt Gen McColl
also judged that:
“Since the
transfer of power, the emergence of a sovereign government,
the
passage of
responsibility from Defense to State, and the increased focus on
MNF-I
on
strategic issues, the climate of decision-making has changed.
The process
is now more
consultative and sensitive to the broader pol/mil
implications,
within Iraq,
regionally and internationally. The dialogue between the
political
elements,
IIG/Embassy, and MNF-I had improved significantly.”
126
Briefing
DIS, 20 October 2004, ‘Predicted insurgent activity in North
Babil’.
127
Minutes, 20
October 2004, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
128
Submission
DG Op Pol to APS/Secretary of State [MOD], 20 October 2004,
‘Potential movement
of troops
in Iraq’.
129
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 20
October 2004, columns 882-885.
130
Report
McColl to CDS and CJO, 20 October 2004, ‘SBMR-I Hauldown Report –
Lt Gen McColl’.
436