The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
meant that
undertaking major new infrastructure projects had become
impossible. The
ISG agreed
that this was:
“… an
entirely sound approach, but noted the large gap between what we
planned
to offer
and Iraqi expectations. This would need careful
management.”
593.
Dr Rosalind
Marsden, the newly arrived Consul General in Basra, reported
on
24 August
that her first impression of the Basra political scene was of
“stasis”.340
The
Provincial
Government had yet to show itself capable of responding to Basra’s
major
security
and economic challenges. Local leaders were comfortable blaming
each other
and the
coalition for the lack of progress, while pursuing their “criminal
interests”. The
Better
Basra Plan had “most of the ingredients” to break the log-jam, but
the UK’s
influence
was diminishing.
594.
Section 9.5
describes the development in August and September of
Operation
SALAMANCA,
the operation to implement the military elements of the
Iraqi
Government’s
Basra Security Plan.
595.
Major General
Richard Shirreff, who took over as GOC MND(SE) in
mid-July,341
told the
Inquiry that Op SALAMANCA comprised three major
elements:
“… what we
did was select different areas of the city, and … surging
with
concentration
of force, secure the area, put teams into the police stations to
go
through the
police stations with a fine-toothed comb, to establish the state
of
police stations
…
“We surged
police training teams in, Royal Military Police and contract
policemen
from
elsewhere. At the same time we conducted a number of
pre-planned
reconstruction
and other projects, everything from levelling football pitches
to
playgrounds,
to refurbishing schools.” 342
596.
Mr Martin
Howard, MOD Director General Operational Policy, told the 25
August
ISOG
meeting that Mr Browne would want to be reassured that
“arrangements
for
delivering civilian activities” were in place and robust before
approving
597.
The British
Embassy Office Basra issued a detailed brief on Op
SALAMANCA
(which it
described as “the security pillar of Better Basra”) by eGram on
12 September.344
The brief
identified the importance of exploiting the conditions created
by
Op SALAMANCA.
Short-term projects under Op SALAMANCA should be linked
to
longer‑term
initiatives. Funding (primarily Iraqi funding) was available, “most
of the right
340
eGram
36964/06 Basra to FCO London, 24 August 2006, ‘Iraq: Basra:
Political Overview’.
341
Report
Cooper, 13 July 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – southern Iraq Update – 13 July
2006.
342
Public
hearing, 11 January 2010, pages 19-20.
343
Minute
Blake to Banner, 25 August 2006, ‘Iraq Senior Officials
Group’.
344
eGram
42792/06, Basra to FCO London, 12 September 2006, ‘Iraq: Basra:
Operation
Salamanca/Date Palm’.
294