9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
and UK in
assessing the readiness of provinces for PIC.47
He observed
that the US
process
was:
“… subject
to exhaustive measurement, in contrast to the rather more
judgemental
criteria we
rely upon … it is what the Americans would regard as the absence
of
empirical
rigour which causes some divergence over the readiness of
MND(SE)
provinces,
particularly Maysan, to transition.
“In
successive monthly assessments, MND(SE) has marked Maysan green
across
all four
transitional criteria. A separate Corps‑level process has not
shared this
judgement
in the areas of threat assessment and governance, citing an
increasing
complexity
in attacks, cross‑border penetration and the JAM sympathies of
the
provincial
governor. As a result, Chiarelli has not felt able to recommend
Maysan
for PIC; a
view shared by Casey, who has reached his own independent
judgment
and is not
simply supporting his subordinate commander. In answer to
the
supplementary
UK question – if not now, then when – both would reply that an
equal
rhetorical
case could be made for some of the intractably difficult areas
under US
control and
vacating the battlespace is not an appropriate response to an
increasing
cross‑border
threat. The danger in all this is that, unless we change the terms
of
engagement,
we risk a dialogue of the deaf and a loss of confidence in the
integrity
of our
reporting.”
58.
Lt Gen Fry
considered that the proposal to re‑posture in Maysan before
transition
to PIC
would “allow considerable savings in force levels” and would remove
the need
to sequence
the transition arrangements in Maysan and Dhi Qar around UK force
levels.
He reported
that Gen Casey was “willing to let the proposal run so long as two
criteria
are
satisfied: we retain a handle on JAM intentions, and we create a
persistent flank
guard
effect against the Iranian border”.
59.
Mr Blair’s
Private Secretary wrote to Mr Browne’s Private Secretary on 10
July
to report
that the Prime Minister was “very concerned at the recent attack
statistics”,
particularly
the “widely reported sectarian killings” in
Baghdad.48
60.
Mr Blair
judged that “overcoming the evident lack of engagement against
the
militias by
the Iraqi government and security forces is a major strategic
task”. As well
as
continuing to press the Iraqi Government to take action, it was
important for the UK
to “have a
clearer view of what action is required, to complement and make up
for the
shortcomings
of the current Baghdad and Basra security plans”.
61.
In addition,
Mr Blair was concerned that the evidence demonstrated that the
Iraqi
Security
Forces were not as capable as had previously been
assessed.
47
Minute Fry
to PSO/CDS, 9 July 2006, ‘SBMR‑I Weekly Report (217): 9 July
2006’.
48
Letter
Banner to McNeil, 10 July 2006, ‘Iraq: Security’.
13