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9.5  |  June 2006 to 27 June 2007
and UK in assessing the readiness of provinces for PIC.47 He observed that the US
process was:
“… subject to exhaustive measurement, in contrast to the rather more judgemental
criteria we rely upon … it is what the Americans would regard as the absence of
empirical rigour which causes some divergence over the readiness of MND(SE)
provinces, particularly Maysan, to transition.
“In successive monthly assessments, MND(SE) has marked Maysan green across
all four transitional criteria. A separate Corps‑level process has not shared this
judgement in the areas of threat assessment and governance, citing an increasing
complexity in attacks, cross‑border penetration and the JAM sympathies of the
provincial governor. As a result, Chiarelli has not felt able to recommend Maysan
for PIC; a view shared by Casey, who has reached his own independent judgment
and is not simply supporting his subordinate commander. In answer to the
supplementary UK question – if not now, then when – both would reply that an equal
rhetorical case could be made for some of the intractably difficult areas under US
control and vacating the battlespace is not an appropriate response to an increasing
cross‑border threat. The danger in all this is that, unless we change the terms of
engagement, we risk a dialogue of the deaf and a loss of confidence in the integrity
of our reporting.”
58.  Lt Gen Fry considered that the proposal to re‑posture in Maysan before transition
to PIC would “allow considerable savings in force levels” and would remove the need
to sequence the transition arrangements in Maysan and Dhi Qar around UK force levels.
He reported that Gen Casey was “willing to let the proposal run so long as two criteria
are satisfied: we retain a handle on JAM intentions, and we create a persistent flank
guard effect against the Iranian border”.
59.  Mr Blair’s Private Secretary wrote to Mr Browne’s Private Secretary on 10 July
to report that the Prime Minister was “very concerned at the recent attack statistics”,
particularly the “widely reported sectarian killings” in Baghdad.48
60.  Mr Blair judged that “overcoming the evident lack of engagement against the
militias by the Iraqi government and security forces is a major strategic task”. As well
as continuing to press the Iraqi Government to take action, it was important for the UK
to “have a clearer view of what action is required, to complement and make up for the
shortcomings of the current Baghdad and Basra security plans”.
61.  In addition, Mr Blair was concerned that the evidence demonstrated that the Iraqi
Security Forces were not as capable as had previously been assessed.
47  Minute Fry to PSO/CDS, 9 July 2006, ‘SBMR‑I Weekly Report (217): 9 July 2006’.
48  Letter Banner to McNeil, 10 July 2006, ‘Iraq: Security’.
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