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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
497.  Reflecting concerns about source protection, the report was given a very limited
distribution to named senior officials.
498.  The report did not make clear that SIS was not itself in contact with the source
whom it considered had direct access to Iraq’s programmes.
499.  The detail of the reporting and Sir Richard Dearlove’s description of it in a
telephone call to Mr Scarlett on 11 September are set out in Section 4.2.
500.  Sir Richard Dearlove briefed Mr Blair on the reporting on 12 September,
when he had:
“… underlined … the potential importance of the new source and what SIS
understood his access to be; but also said that the case was developmental and
that the source remained unproven.”185
501.  SIS4 suggested that Mr Blair had already known about the intelligence before
the meeting between Mr Blair and Sir Richard Dearlove on 12 September, and that he
wanted to see the product.186
502.  Sir Richard Dearlove told the Inquiry that “it would have been very rare” for him to
have talked to Ministers or Mr Blair “about our source base”.187
503.  Asked about Mr Blair’s reaction, Sir Richard told the Inquiry that Sir David Manning
had asked him to give Mr Blair a briefing “which would give him [Mr Blair] more of a
flavour for what was actually going on on the ground”.188 Mr Blair “had an appetite for
that sort of briefing which was a pretty rare event”, and had had a “fair amount of general
discussion” with SIS9 “about the difficulties and problems we were facing”.
504.  Asked whether he had been precipitate in going to Ministers with the report so
quickly, Sir Richard replied:
“I think in the circumstances, I don’t agree … because if you issue a report like that
in the middle of a crisis, you’re going to get a phone call from a Ministerial office
within a short period of time.”189
505.  Sir Richard also stated that in the circumstances it would have been “impossible”
not to issue the report; SIS could not “sit on something as potentially important”
as that.190
185  Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph 578.
186  Private hearing, Part 1, page 58.
187  Private hearing, 16 June 2010, page 53.
188  Private hearing, 13 July 2010, page 33.
189  Private hearing, 13 July 2010, pages 34-35.
190  Private hearing, 13 July 2010, page 35.
380
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