The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
518.
In addition,
the tendency to refer in public statements only to Iraq’s
“weapons
of mass
destruction” without addressing their nature (the type of warhead
and whether
they were
battlefield or strategic weapons systems) or how they might be used
(as a
last resort
against invading military forces or as a weapon of terror to
threaten civilian
populations
in other countries) was likely to have created the impression that
Iraq posed
a greater
threat than the detailed JIC Assessments would have
supported.
519.
From late
February 2002, the UK Government position was that Iraq was a
threat
that had to
be dealt with; that Iraq needed to disarm in accordance with the
obligations
imposed by
the UN; and that it was important to agree to the return of UN
inspectors
to Iraq.
520.
The urgency
and certainty with which the position was stated reflected both
the
ingrained
beliefs already described and the wider context in which the policy
was being
discussed
with the US.
521.
But it also
served to fuel the demand that the Government should publish
the
document it
was known to have prepared, setting out the reasons why it was
so
concerned
about Iraq.
522.
In the spring
and summer of 2002, senior officials and Ministers took the view
that
the Iraq
dossier should not be published until the way ahead on the policy
was clearer.
523.
By late August
2002, the Government was troubled by intense speculation
about
whether a
decision had already been taken to use military force. In
Mr Blair’s words, the
US and UK
had been “outed” as having taken a decision when no such decision
had
been
taken.
524.
Mr Blair’s
decision on 3 September to announce that the dossier would
be
published
was a response to that pressure.
525.
The dossier
was designed to “make the case” and secure Parliamentary
(and
public)
support for the Government’s position that action was urgently
required to secure
Iraq’s
disarmament.
526.
The UK
Government intended the information and judgements in the Iraq
dossier
to be seen
to be the product of the JIC in order to carry authority with
Parliament and
the public.
527.
The Secret
Intelligence Service (SIS) was commissioned by No.10 on 5
September
to examine
whether it had any additional material which could be
included.
528.
Mr Scarlett,
as Chairman of the JIC, was given the responsibility of
producing
the dossier.
72