The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

Gulf to a divisional headquarters with a square armoured brigade and 16 Air Assault

Brigade for operations in northern Iraq. The emphasis was on options to be used in the

North, although Lt Gen Reith stated:

“… a contribution could still be offered (albeit under significant constraints) for use …

in the South, if movement through Tu[rkey] became politically unacceptable.”

646. Lt Gen Reith recommended an option to deploy a UK divisional HQ and an

armoured brigade comprising three battalions or regiments (a “triangular” brigade)

alongside a US brigade:

“This option best balances the key requirements of providing a worthwhile military

contribution, with appropriate political profile, although above the target figure

of 20,000.”

647. Adm Boyce asked in a manuscript comment:

“How is this conclusion reached? There is no analysis of the pluses and minuses

of the options and the extent to which they meet essential criteria.”261

648. Lt Gen Reith also wrote: “It is perceived that CENTCOM would prefer the land

operation in the North to be commanded at the tactical level by the UK.”262

649. Adm Boyce questioned in a manuscript comment: “Has he asked for this or is it

an assumption?”263

650. Lt Gen Reith submitted revised advice on 13 September, which recommended the

deployment of a square brigade comprising two armoured regiments and two armoured

infantry battalions.264 He also stated that Gen Frank’s “strong preference” was for the UK

“to provide the tactical lead for the North”.

651. There was no explanation in the paper for the revised recommendation.

652. Knowledge of the consideration of military options continued to be kept to

a very tight group of people and the sensitivities about potential leaks remained.

653. Mr Drummond alerted Sir David Manning on 16 September to a prospective

request from the MOD on military options. He had advised that the “PM would want first

sight”; and that No.10 would advise on circulation.265

261 Manuscript comment Boyce on Minute Reith to DCDS(C), 12 September 2002, ‘Potential UK

Contribution to US Operations Against Iraq’.

262 Minute Reith to DCDS(C), 12 September 2002, ‘Potential UK Contribution to US Operations

Against Iraq’.

263 Manuscript comment Boyce on Minute Reith to DCDS(C), 12 September 2002, ‘Potential UK

Contribution to US Operations Against Iraq’.

264 Minute Reith to DCDS(C), 13 September 2002, ‘Potential UK Contribution to US Operations

Against Iraq’.

265 Minute Drummond to Manning, 16 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Pigott Meeting’.

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