The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
of the
campaign plan and decided to allocate its 4th Infantry Division to
that task.
That precluded
a UK lead.
1384.
Asked if the
UK never talked about leading it, Lord Boyce replied: “No, and
it
would
remain on the table right until January 2003.”539
1385.
Asked whether
the northern option was the UK’s preference or something
the
US “very
much wanted” the UK to do, Lord Boyce told the Inquiry that it was
“probably a
bit of
both”. If Turkey had agreed, it would have been a “sensible way” of
deploying a UK
division
alongside the US 4th Division.540
1386.
Asked whether
given the southern No‑Fly Zone had been more difficult than
the
northern
one, the UK had been more comfortable operating in the North, Lord
Boyce
replied
that was:
“… correct
and it’s also true that we felt we would be more compatible with
the [US]
4th
Infantry Division than with other American divisions
…”541
1387.
Lord Boyce
added that they were also concerned about the relatively
small
area of
Kuwait for the entry of forces, and that it depended “hugely on the
host nation
support”,
although he acknowledged that the latter was also true for
Turkey.542
1388.
Lord Boyce
subsequently told the Inquiry:
“… we
thought that the North made sense to fix the Iraqi forces in that
part of the
country, to
do what we could to secure the oilfields before they got trashed
by
Saddam
Hussein and also to do what we could to preserve the Kurdish state
up
there and
make sure there was not an assault on the Kurds from either the
Turks
or the
Iraqis.
“So it
appeared to be a neat option …”543
1389.
Asked for the
reasons why the military advice appeared to stress the North
rather
than the
South, Sir Kevin Tebbit told the Inquiry that he did not think
there had been a
“particular
UK dimension”:
•
The UK had
“particular concerns” about the consequences if Saddam
Hussein
moved his
troops into the Kurdish area. He did not recall that directly
influencing
military
planning, but it was “recognised very actively” at the political
level.
•
The UK had
a military interest in the operation of the northern No‑Fly
Zone.
539
Public
hearing, 3 December 2009, page 22.
540
Public
hearing, 3 December 2009, pages 23‑24.
541
Public
hearing, 3 December 2009, page 53.
542
Public
hearing, 3 December 2009, page 54.
543
Public
hearing, 27 January 2011, page 13.
378