The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
844.
A DFID
update on humanitarian planning for No.10 on 7 March stated
that:
•
In the
event of conflict, DFID would assess the scale of the
humanitarian
need,
identify the UN agency best placed to respond and
provide
immediate
funding.
•
DFID would
also be advising the military, to whom immediate
responsibility
for assistance would fall.
•
Reconstruction
plans were less well advanced. DFID’s focus had been
on
ensuring
the international community and the US recognised the scale
of
the task
and the need for a UN mandate.
845.
DFID urged
Mr Blair to press the case with the US immediately for
a
resolution
authorising reconstruction. UK participation in military action
should
be made
conditional on such a resolution.
846.
Sir David
Manning advised Mr Blair to engage President Bush on the
issue
the
following week, but to focus first on the second
resolution.
847.
Mr Blair
received a DFID update on humanitarian assistance and
reconstruction
planning on
7 March.356
The paper
stated that the principle underlying DFID’s
humanitarian
assistance was “to provide rapid support to whoever is best placed
to meet
the
immediate needs of the people”. There was now a DFID staff presence
in ORHA and
1 (UK) Div
in Kuwait, with further deployments to the region and UN agencies
imminent.
£10m had
been earmarked for UN and NGO contingency planning and supplies
were in
place to
provide shelter for up to 25,000 people. DFID would:
“… respond
to the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people through supporting
the
international
humanitarian system, principally the UN, Red Cross/Crescent and
key
NGOs to
save lives and alleviate suffering. We would be able to allocate up
to £65m
from our
contingency reserve.”
848.
In the event
of conflict, DFID would assess the scale of the humanitarian
need,
identify
the UN agency best placed to respond and provide immediate funding
for it to
do so,
although immediate responsibility for assistance would fall to the
military, to whom
DFID would
be giving advice.
849.
The paper
stated that reconstruction plans were less well advanced. The focus
of
DFID’s
work, in collaboration with other government departments, had been
“to ensure
the
international community, especially the US, realises the enormous
scale of the
task and
the necessity of a UN mandate”. Uncertainty over that issue was
holding up
planning,
but DFID had held discussions with the World Bank and other
partners. One of
356
Letter
Warren to Rycroft, 7 March 2003 attaching Paper DFID, [undated],
‘DFID Planning on Iraq’.
464