The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

Reform to work” was a key element of supporting the Iraqi Security Forces to deliver

security.156 The strategy also recommended that the UK should “encourage the ITG [Iraqi

Transitional Government] to relax the rules on de‑Ba’athification as a way of drawing

disaffected former Army officers and officials back into the system”.

186. In early March, senior US and UK officials discussed the strategy for Iraq in

2005.157 They identified that, in order to modify the current policy, “one option might be

to shift de‑Ba’athification from a political to a quasi‑judicial process”. Mr Asquith said

that de‑Ba’athification was likely to be on the agenda of the new government at an early

stage and so “we should start engaging the likely key players … at this stage before

their views became settled”.

187. A few days later, Mr Charles Heatly (a No.10 Press Officer who had returned from

a secondment in Iraq, where he had been working in Prime Minister Allawi’s office)

advised Mr Blair that one of the key points for UK engagement with the new government

should be: “Minimising the fall‑out from de‑Ba’athification etc. On our side, we should

continue to monitor carefully, and advise caution.”158

188. In late March, Mr Straw also identified the “enormous damage that could be done

to efforts at outreach by a significant renewal of the de‑Ba’athification drive” as one of

the messages being given to the United Iraq Coalition, which had gained the highest

number of seats in January’s election.159

189. On 6 May, Mr Chaplin reported to the FCO on prospects for Prime Minister

Ja’afari’s government.160 He identified “how to square the zeal for renewed

de‑Ba’athification in the army, police and ministries with maintaining effective forces to

fight the insurgency” as an early challenge. Mr Chaplin reported assurances from Prime

Minster Ja’afari that he would only pursue individuals “who have crimes to answer for”.

190. On 5 July, Mr Straw wrote to Mr Blair about the Iraqi Constitution.161 He reported

that the timetable remained “tight, but doable”. The UK would need to maintain pressure

on the drafters and senior Iraqi politicians to stick to the principle of consensus and

work towards agreement of a document which reflected the values and aspirations of all

Iraqis.

191. Sunni involvement in the Committee established to draft a new Constitution for Iraq

is addressed in Section 9.3.

156 Paper Cabinet Office, 7 February 2005, ‘Iraq: Strategy for 2005’.

157 Minute Fergusson to Sheinwald, 2 March 2005, ‘Iraq: VTC Meeting with NSC/Department of State/

Pentagon 28 February 2005’.

158 Minute Heatly to Prime Minister, 10 March 2005, ‘Iraq: Risks and Media Impact’.

159 Minute Straw to Prime Minister, 24 March 2005, ‘Iraq: Ad Hoc Ministerial Meetings’.

160 eGram 4045/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 6 May 2005, ‘Iraq: Prospects for the Ja’afari Government’.

161 Letter Straw to Prime Minister, 5 July 2005, ‘Iraq: Constitution’ attaching Paper RAD, June 2005,

‘Constitutional Issues’.

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