The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
without
external intervention. In this regard, Iraq is different from
either North Korea
or Iran and
its involvement in weapons of mass destruction that much more
deadly.”
101.
A copy of the
minute, which was sent to Mr Straw on 19 August, was sent
to
Sir David
Manning on 21 August.37
102.
When
Mr Straw and Secretary Powell met on 20 August, they discussed
Mr Blair’s
Note to
President Bush of 28 July and its impact on thinking in the
US.38
103.
Mr Simon
McDonald, Mr Straw’s Principal Private Secretary, reported
that
Secretary
Powell had “spoken frankly”. He told Mr Straw that
Mr Blair’s “letter [the Note
of 28
July]” to President Bush had been “very timely”. The “case for
doing something
straight
away was being pressed hard”. Secretary Powell was “putting the
case for a
longer
haul”, including during a private dinner with President Bush at
which Dr Rice was
been the
only other person present.
104.
Secretary
Powell told Mr Straw that what happened next would depend on
what
US
“Principals” heard in their meeting 10 days later, “in particular
about the status of
the
military plan”. President Bush was keen to hear the outcome of the
discussion
with
Mr Straw. Dossiers on the “case for action” were being
prepared: “True believers
would see a
smoking gun no matter what. But most of the stuff Iraq was
importing was
dual‑use.
It was not clear that the situation was any more serious this year
than last.”
105.
Mr Straw
handed over a copy of the UK’s draft dossier on Iraq: “Although it
made
clear that
Saddam was a very bad man, the contents did not lead inexorably to
the
conclusion
that the only way to deal with him was by military action.”
Secretary Powell
agreed that
“containment had worked”.
106.
Mr Straw
told Secretary Powell that he had discussed the position with
Mr Blair the
previous
day. Mr Blair was concerned and had:
“… asked
him to stress that the problem was that we had been ‘outed’ long
before
we had been
able to make the case with the public for action … [Mr Blair]
was
also signed
up to the importance of the relationship with the US, and had
moved
mountains
to ensure that the EU stayed in line with the US. Nonetheless, he
had
been
irritated to find himself in his present position because of US
hawks … The key
issue … was
whether the US wanted an international coalition or not. The US
could
go it
alone; if they wanted that, they had only to tell us.”
107.
Mr Straw’s
view was that:
“… the case
for an international coalition was overwhelming: first for basing
and
access and
then for what would happen after getting rid of Saddam. But
also,
37
Manuscript
comment McDonald to Manning, 21 August 2002, on Minute
Williams to Secretary of State
[FCO], 19
August 2002, ‘The United States and Iraq: Historical
Parallels’.
38
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 21 August 2002, ‘Foreign Secretary’s Visit to
the US, 20 August 2002’.
112