1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
“For the
safety and stability of the region and the wider world, he cannot
be allowed
to do so.
If he will not, through reason and diplomacy, abandon his weapons
of mass
destruction
programme, it must be degraded and diminished by military
force.” 271
666.
Mr Blair
said that Saddam Hussein had “no intention of abiding by the
agreements
he has
made”. The report from Mr Butler had been “damning”; it was “a
catalogue of
obstruction”
based on a desire to develop weapons of mass destruction. There was
a
threat
“now” to Saddam Hussein’s neighbours, his people, “and to the
security of the
world”. If
he was not stopped, the consequences would be “real and
fundamental”, and
that could
not “responsibly” be allowed to happen.
667.
Mr Blair
concluded that there was “no realistic alternative to military
force”: “We
have
exhausted all other avenues. We act because we must.”
668.
Mr Burleigh
informed the President of the Security Council that “Coalition
forces”
were making
“substantial” military attacks against “Iraq’s weapons of mass
destruction
programmes
and its ability to threaten its neighbours”.272
669.
Mr Burleigh
stated that:
•
The action
was a “necessary and proportionate response to the
continued
refusal
of the Iraqi Government to comply with the resolutions of
the
Security Council”.
•
It had been
“undertaken only when it became evident that diplomacy had
been
exhausted”.
The coalition had “acted out of necessity” and the Government
of
Iraq bore
“full responsibility” for the consequences of the military action.
The US
had not
acted “precipitately”, but had worked “with its partners in the
Security
Council
over the past months in a sincere and sustained effort to bring
about
a peaceful
resolution of the confrontation created by Iraq”. “For reasons
best
known to
Saddam Hussein, Iraq chose to reject that effort.”
•
Iraq had
“repeatedly taken actions” which constituted “flagrant
material
breaches”
of the provisions in relevant Security Council resolutions:
“On
a number of
occasions, the Council has affirmed that similar Iraqi
actions
constituted
such breaches, as well as a threat to international peace
and
security.”
The US view was that “the Council need not state these
conclusions
on each
occasion”.
•
Iraq had
“once again, acted in flagrant and material breach of Security
Council
resolution
687 (1991)” by “refusing to make available documents and
information
requested
by UNSCOM … by imposing new restrictions on the
weapons
271
BBC
News,
16 December 1998, Blair’s
statement on Iraq strikes: full text.
272
UN Security
Council, 16 December 1998, ‘Letter dated 16 December 1998
from the Charge D’Affaires
AI of the
United States Mission to the United Nations addressed to the
President of the Security Council’
(S/1998/1181).
149