Introduction
and key findings ........................................................................................
425
Planning
and preparation for the post-conflict search
for WMD ...................................
426
Security
Council debate on the future role of UNMOVIC ........................................
442
Creation of
the Iraq Survey Group ................................................................................
443
Managing
public expectations .......................................................................................
452
Pressure to
set up an independent inquiry on pre-conflict
intelligence .........................
469
House of
Commons debates on Iraq, 4 June 2003 ................................................
474
Dr Blix’s
final report to the Security Council ............................................................
481
The JIC
Sub-Committee on Iraq/WMD and the WMD Task Force .........................
483
UK concerns
about the ISG’s slow start .................................................................
486
JIC
Assessment, 27 June 2003: ‘Iraq WMD: The Emerging
Picture’ ......................
495
FAC Report,
7 July 2003: ‘The Decision to go to War in
Iraq’ .......................................
498
Mr Blair’s
evidence to the Liaison Committee, 8 July
2003 ....................................
499
House of
Commons debate on Iraq, 15 July 2003 .................................................
500
JIC Current
Intelligence Group Assessment, 16 July 2003:
‘Iraq:
Prohibited
Ballistic Missile Designs’ ........................................................................
503
The ISG
builds momentum ...........................................................................................
505
Preparation
of the ISG Interim Report ....................................................................
511
JIC
discussion of the draft ISG Interim Report .......................................................
515
ISC Report,
11 September 2003: ‘Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction
–
Intelligence and Assessments’ ......................................................................................
518
The ISG
Interim Report, 2 October 2003 ......................................................................
520
Follow-up
to the ISG Interim Report .............................................................................
530
House of
Commons debate on Iraq, 22 October 2003 ...........................................
531
Impact of
the transfer of ISG resources from WMD to
counter‑terrorism ...............
531
Government
responses to the FAC ........................................................................
534
The
transition from Dr Kay to Mr Duelfer ......................................................................
535
Dr Kay’s
evidence to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 28 January
2004 ...
546
423