The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

and civilian people in Basra from the start. We must make a last effort to get

a joined-up operation.”

691. Mr Blair wrote on Sir Nigel’s minute: “Put Shirreff in charge. The Army gets things

done.” 390

692. A No.10 official wrote to Mrs Beckett’s Private Secretary on 8 January, advising

that Mr Blair retained an open mind on how to improve civilian/military co-operation in

Basra.391 He looked forward to receiving advice from officials, and was “if necessary …

content that this should be delivered via a task force under military leadership”.

693. At DOP(I) on 11 January, Ministers commented that “unbalanced reporting from the

military in theatre, disparaging the civilian effort” was “extremely unhelpful”.392 It was not

the right time to create a new UK military-led structure when the UK was trying to put the

Iraqi Government in the lead.

694. Mr Dinham, who attended the DOP(I) meeting, reported to DFID colleagues

that Mr Benn had spoken strongly against Maj Gen Shirreff’s proposal, arguing that

the UK should let existing, Iraqi-led organisations find their feet, accept that the

Iraq Government might not be that interested in our continued advice and help, and

recognise that the time for further UK bilateral pushes on reconstruction was coming to

an end.393 Mr Dinham added that ACM Stirrup had “agreed absolutely with everything

that Hilary [Benn] had said”.

695. After receiving a further update from Basra on 12 January, Mr Blair wrote: “I still

need more info on Basra and have we established the Joint Working yet, led by the

military?” 394

696. The meeting of the ISOG on the same day discussed the problems with civilian/

military co-ordination.395 The ISOG agreed that there were a number of contributing

factors, “including personalities, departmental differences in duty of care, and too

infrequent meetings of the southern Iraq Steering Group”. There was a need to revise

structures, to balance the military effort with the civilian, to balance long- and short-term

efforts, and that “a military lead was not the right way to go at this time”. Dr Marsden

and Maj Gen Shirreff, supported by PCRU, were preparing recommendations on a

revised structure.

390 Manuscript comment Blair on Minute Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 5 January 2007,

‘Iraq: Weekly Update’.

391 Letter Banner to Siddiq, 8 January 2007, ‘Iraq’.

392 Minutes, 11 January 2007, DOP(I) meeting.

393 Email Dinham to DFID [junior official], 11 January 2007, ‘Restricted: DOP(I)’.

394 Manuscript comment Blair on Minute Banner to Blair, 12 January 2007, ‘Iraq Update,

12 December’[sic].

395 Minute Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 12 January 2007, ‘Iraq Senior Officials Group’.

308