3.8 | Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March 2003

285. Mr Campbell added that:

• Mr Straw had said “we were victims of hopeless bullying and arrogant

diplomacy” and that the UK “was being driven by the US political strategy”.

• Sir David Manning also thought the actions had been “a rather crude attempt to

shaft us” and had “felt we should say to the Americans they could only use our

troops after the first effort and also on humanitarian duties”.

• Mr Blair “did not want to go down that route, no matter how much he agreed the

Americans were not being helpful”.

286. In his daily conference call with the White House, Mr Campbell told the US that

it should not comment on UK politics and, in a later call he told Mr Dan Bartlett,

President Bush’s Communications Director, that the US was doing real damage.

287. In Prime Minister’s Questions (PMQs) on 12 March, Mr Blair focused on

efforts to secure a second resolution and the importance for the UN of being

seen to act in response to Saddam Hussein’s failure to co-operate as required

by resolution 1441 and of achieving unity in the international community.

288. In a clear reference to President Chirac’s statement on 10 March but without

naming France, Mr Blair drew attention to the difficulties created by countries

saying that they would veto a resolution “whatever the circumstances”.

289. Mr Blair also stated that:

• the UK would not do anything which did not have a proper legal basis; and

• it was the Government’s intention to seek a vote on a second resolution

“in a way that most upholds the authority of the UN”.

290. Mr Rycroft sent an urgent email to Mr Powell, Sir David Manning and other No.10

officials at 11.48am, informing them that the French Ambassador to the UK (Mr Gérard

Errera) had called “on the instructions of the Elysée”.101

291. Mr Rycroft reported that Mr Errera had told him that President Chirac’s comment

about a veto:

“… needed to be read in the context of what had been said immediately before

about two hypotheses – either our resolution gets nine votes or it doesn’t. In other

words, the Ambassador claims that it is not the case that he [President Chirac] said

that he would vote no against any resolution.”

292. Most of the questions raised during PMQs on 12 March related to Iraq.102

101 Email Rycroft to No.10 officials, 12 March 2003, ‘French veto – urgent’.

102 House of Commons, Official Report, 12 March 2003, columns 280-290.

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