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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
105.  The official wrote that the new Order had not happened because of a wider sense
of sensitivity about work on Iraq’s intelligence agencies.
106.  In late July Sir Jeremy Greenstock, who was to succeed Mr Sawers as the Prime
Minister’s Special Representative on Iraq in September, had a bilateral meeting with
the UN Special Representative, Mr Sérgio Vieira de Mello.96 During that discussion,
Mr Vieira de Mello’s adviser had cautioned that “we should not over emulate post‑war
Germany in the extreme to which we took de‑Ba’athification”.
107.  According to the authors of the RAND report Occupying Iraq, in August 2003
Ambassador Crocker was raising concerns with Ambassador Bremer about the differing
ways in which the de‑Ba’athification policy was being implemented across Iraq.97 He also
identified that it was affecting more than just hard‑core supporters of Saddam Hussein,
and that procedures for making exceptions were slow.
108.  Ambassador Crocker suggested transferring responsibility for the implementation
of de‑Ba’athification to the GC, on the grounds that “an Iraqi body would be more
sensitive to the nuances of the policy”. As a result, on 10 August Ambassador Bremer
put a proposal entitled “Proposal for Implementing the Iraqi de‑Ba’athification Council”
to the GC.
109.  In early September Mr Blair’s Assistant Private Secretary recorded that he believed
“flexible handling of de‑Ba’athification” was needed to avoid excluding potential recruits
to the Iraqi police unnecessarily.98
110.  Mr David Richmond, the Prime Minister’s Interim Special Representative on Iraq,
reported on 4 September that Ambassador Bremer understood the need for flexibility
on de‑Ba’athification, as did a senior Iraqi interlocutor; although they would be “closely
watched by some members of the Governing Council who are strongly opposed to any
concessions in this area”.99
111.  On 8 September, in a House of Lords debate following an Oral Statement on Iraq
and the Middle East, Baroness Symons, FCO Minister of State, commented:
“The fact that so many senior Iraqi officials in all walks of life, whether civilian or
military, were members of the Ba’ath party was a function of the old regime … in
clearing out anyone who was a member of the Ba’ath party, a great deal of valuable
expertise has been lost. I believe that we have now found a better balance on
that issue.”100
96 Telegram 1116 UKMis New York to FCO London, 23 July 2003, ‘Iraq: meeting with de Mello’.
97 Dobbins J, Jones SG, Runkle B & Mohandas S. Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional
Authority. RAND Corporation, 2009.
98 Letter Cannon to Adams, 2 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Briefing for Prime Minister’.
99 Telegram 150 IraqRep to FCO London, 4 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Briefing for Prime Minister’.
100 House of Lords, Official Report, 8 September 2003, column 49.
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