The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
105.
The official
wrote that the new Order had not happened because of a wider
sense
of
sensitivity about work on Iraq’s intelligence
agencies.
106.
In late July
Sir Jeremy Greenstock, who was to succeed Mr Sawers as
the Prime
Minister’s
Special Representative on Iraq in September, had a bilateral
meeting with
the UN
Special Representative, Mr Sérgio Vieira de
Mello.96
During that
discussion,
Mr Vieira
de Mello’s adviser had cautioned that “we should not over emulate
post‑war
Germany in
the extreme to which we took de‑Ba’athification”.
107.
According to
the authors of the RAND report Occupying
Iraq, in August
2003
Ambassador
Crocker was raising concerns with Ambassador Bremer about the
differing
ways in
which the de‑Ba’athification policy was being implemented across
Iraq.97
He
also
identified
that it was affecting more than just hard‑core supporters of Saddam
Hussein,
and that
procedures for making exceptions were slow.
108.
Ambassador
Crocker suggested transferring responsibility for the
implementation
of
de‑Ba’athification to the GC, on the grounds that “an Iraqi body
would be more
sensitive
to the nuances of the policy”. As a result, on 10 August Ambassador
Bremer
put a
proposal entitled “Proposal for Implementing the Iraqi
de‑Ba’athification Council”
to the
GC.
109.
In early
September Mr Blair’s Assistant Private Secretary recorded that
he believed
“flexible
handling of de‑Ba’athification” was needed to avoid excluding
potential recruits
to the
Iraqi police unnecessarily.98
110.
Mr David
Richmond, the Prime Minister’s Interim Special Representative on
Iraq,
reported on
4 September that Ambassador Bremer understood the need for
flexibility
on
de‑Ba’athification, as did a senior Iraqi interlocutor; although
they would be “closely
watched by
some members of the Governing Council who are strongly opposed to
any
concessions
in this area”.99
111.
On 8
September, in a House of Lords debate following an Oral Statement
on Iraq
and the
Middle East, Baroness Symons, FCO Minister of State,
commented:
“The fact
that so many senior Iraqi officials in all walks of life, whether
civilian or
military,
were members of the Ba’ath party was a function of the old regime …
in
clearing
out anyone who was a member of the Ba’ath party, a great deal of
valuable
expertise
has been lost. I believe that we have now found a better balance
on
96
Telegram
1116 UKMis New York to FCO London, 23 July 2003, ‘Iraq: meeting
with de Mello’.
97
Dobbins J,
Jones SG, Runkle B & Mohandas S. Occupying
Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional
Authority.
RAND
Corporation, 2009.
98
Letter
Cannon to Adams, 2 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Briefing for Prime
Minister’.
99
Telegram
150 IraqRep to FCO London, 4 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Briefing for
Prime Minister’.
100
House of
Lords, Official
Report, 8
September 2003, column 49.
24