9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
Nigel
Sheinwald). If necessary he is content that this should be
delivered via a task
force under
military leadership.”
398.
On 8 January,
an official in the IPU reported a conversation with a counterpart
in
Washington
which suggested that Prime Minister Maliki had been resistant to
the surge,
and that US
officials were struggling to explain how the increase in US troops
would
support the
Iraqi Government in taking more of a lead.215
399.
Mr Blair
and President Bush spoke again on 9 January.216
Mr Blair
said that
he
considered the key points to get across in the President’s speech
would be that
additional
troops had a specific and identified task in Baghdad and that “this
was part
of a
way plan, to which Maliki’s government was committed”.
400.
President Bush
announced the new US strategy in an address to the nation
on
“The
situation in Iraq is unacceptable to the American people – and it
is
unacceptable
to me …
“It is
clear that we need to change our strategy in Iraq.”
401.
The most
urgent priority was security, especially in Baghdad,
where:
“… violence
is splitting Baghdad into sectarian enclaves, and shaking the
confidence
of all
Iraqis …
“Our past
efforts to secure Baghdad failed for two principal reasons: There
were not
enough
Iraqi and American troops to secure neighbourhoods that had been
cleared
of
terrorists and insurgents. And there were too many restrictions on
the troops we
did
have.”
402.
President Bush
announced that the Iraqi Government would appoint a
military
commander
and two deputy commanders for Baghdad, and planned to deploy 18
Iraqi
Army and
National Police brigades. They would be supported by more than
20,000
additional
US troops. Those troops would work alongside Iraqi units and be
embedded
in their
formations. President Bush said:
“Our troops
will have a well‑defined mission: to help Iraqis clear and
secure
neighbourhoods,
to help them protect the local population, and to help
ensure
that the
Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security
that
Baghdad needs.”
215
Email Casey
to Lever, 8 January 2007, ‘Iraq: Bush Speech’.
216
Letter
Banner to Hayes, 9 January 2007, ‘Prime Minister’s Phonecall with
President Bush, 9 January:
Middle East
Issues’.
217
The White
House archive, 10 January 2007, President’s Address to the
Nation.
75