The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
164.
Mr Baker
briefed the Iraq Strategy Group on 28 July that the “sticking
point” on
the
Electoral Law “was how Kirkuk would be governed until 2010” and
“prospects for
agreement
were poor”.60
Mr McDonald
emphasised the importance to Mr Brown of
elections
taking place on time. The Group agreed to keep up pressure for the
Electoral
Law to be
adopted before 30 July, including through conversations with US
interlocutors.
165.
Mr Baker
also reported that FCO and MOD lawyers were working
towards
agreeing
the UK’s internal position on the legal arrangements for British
forces in Iraq, to
enable
negotiations to start in early September, subject to Iraqi
agreement. He observed
that the
FCO and the MOD “would require a judgement by the Attorney General
about
use of
force, given that the Iraqis would not want us to declare that an
internal armed
conflict
existed in Iraq”.
166.
The Iraq
Strategy Group judged that the US negotiations, which were
close
to
agreement, were unlikely to complicate the UK’s, although “we may
face a tough
negotiation
if the US agreement did not include elements which we will want
included
in our
own agreement”.
167.
On 7 August,
the JIC reviewed security prospects for the Kurdish north of Iraq,
at
the request
of the MOD and the FCO.61
168.
The JIC judged
that the Kurdistan Region was still the most stable part of
Iraq,
continuing
to outpace the rest of the country in terms of trade,
reconstruction, investment
and
economic growth. By contrast, the other northern provinces – Ninawa
and Ta’min
(formerly
Kirkuk), which were administered by the Government of Iraq –
accounted
for more
than 80 percent of insurgent attacks recorded across Iraq. Unlike
central
and
southern Iraq, much of the violence there was ethnically motivated.
Criminality,
especially
extortion and intimidation by insurgents, was a serious
problem.
169.
The JIC’s Key
Judgments included:
“III. The
Arab/Kurd dispute over control of Kirkuk and other territories is
likely to
intensify
in the next few months as the UN makes its recommendations on
their
future
administration. Street fighting and displacement of local
communities could
occur with
little warning, and solidify ethnic divisions in local
ISF.
“IV.
Intensified coalition and ISF operations have failed to eradicate
Al Qaida in
Iraq (AQ-I)
in Mosul. But they have greatly limited its operational
effectiveness and
access to
funding. AQ-I is nevertheless likely to be capable of occasional
surges in
activity
including high profile attacks in Iraq’s major cities for the
foreseeable future.
60
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to McDonald, 31 July 2008, ‘Iraq
Strategy Group, 28 July’.
61
JIC
Assessment, 7 August 2008, ‘Iraq: Security in the
North’.
408