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6.1  |  Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq
238.  In relation to military planning, Sir Christopher reported that he had been told by
a senior official in the State Department that:
The timeframe discussed between Mr Blair and President Bush was still valid:
the first quarter of next year was “realistic” for action against Saddam Hussein.
CENTCOM was hearing from British military sources that we were
contemplating contributing an armoured division.
239.  In discussions with Dr Rice on Iraq, Sir David Manning was assured that the UK
would be brought into the planning process at a very early stage, once such planning
got under way.120
240.  One significant and potentially awkward fact emerged from a meeting with
Mr Richard Armitage, US Deputy Secretary of State, when Sir David Manning was
told that a report that “a UK officer at Tampa had said that the UK would provide
an armoured division” was “dropped into the conversation” of the most senior US
policy‑makers.121
241.  On the record of the meeting in the Chief of the Defence Staff files, a handwritten
comment to Adm Boyce said: “This could unstitch your line with the PM tomorrow.”122
242.  Mr Hoon’s Private Office sent a note to Adm Boyce’s office on 21 May, recording
that the Defence Secretary was “surprised and concerned” by this report:
“Given the very close hold under which contingency planning for Iraq has been
conducted and the fact that no options have yet been presented to Ministers, the
Secretary of State would be grateful for any light which can be thrown upon this
story. Is the UK team in Tampa party to the current work on Iraq?”123
243.  Adm Boyce’s office replied that “the UK team in Tampa is not party to current
MOD work on Iraq” and:
“… our investigations indicate that there has been no authenticated or officially
recorded message passed to General Franks, or anyone else at Tampa, that the
UK ‘would’ provide a division. We can only assume that this is speculation based
on UK’s contribution to the Gulf War 1991 which has been misinterpreted.”124
244.  A manuscript note to Mr Hoon on the document states “we can assume the point
has been made”.
120 Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 18 May 2002, ‘David Manning’s Visit to Washington, 17 May; Iraq’.
121 Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 18 May 2002, ‘David Manning’s Visit to Washington, 17 May Iraq’.
122 Manuscript comment [unattributed] on Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 18 May 2002, ‘David Manning’s
Visit to Washington, 17 May Iraq’.
123 Minute Williams to PSO/CDS, 21 May 2002, ‘David Manning’s Visit to Washington 17 May – Iraq’.
124 Minute Shirreff to APS/Secretary of State, 31 May 2002, ‘David Manning’s Visit to Washington
17 May – Iraq’.
211
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