The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
312.
Summing up the
discussion, Mr Blair said that following progress in Iraq and
on
the MEPP
“the question was how the Arab world itself would develop, shorn of
its most
brutal
dictatorship”.
313.
Later that
day, Mr Straw told the AHMGIR that a draft resolution had been
agreed,
and “the
text was satisfactory”.192
314.
An
unidentified member of the AHMGIR observed that since there had
been no
success in
negotiating an MOU, the UK “must therefore be particularly careful
to ensure
that we had
legal cover for our efforts”.
315.
The AHMGIR was
told that Mr Sawers had been appointed as UK Special
Representative
and would work closely with “ORHA and the new US
Representative,
Bremer, on
the political process”.
316.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock and Ambassador Negroponte wrote jointly to the
President
of the
Security Council on 8 May.193
317.
Sir Jeremy
explained to the Inquiry that the letter “described what we were
doing
in administering
Iraq and what our intentions were”.194
318.
An earlier
draft of the letter had implied that Gen Franks was the entirety of
the
CPA, which
led Mr Straw to protest to Secretary Powell that “although Franks
may be
Supreme
Commander, we had our responsibilities too”.195
319.
The joint
letter began by stating that the US and UK and their Coalition
partners
continued
to act together to ensure the complete disarmament of Iraq of WMD
in
accordance
with UN Security Council resolutions.196
It went on
to say that the Coalition:
•
would abide
strictly by their obligations under international law;
•
would act
to ensure that Iraq’s oil was protected and used for the benefit of
the
Iraqi
people;
•
had
“created the Coalition Provisional Authority, which includes the
Office of
Reconstruction
and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), to exercise powers
of
government temporarily, and … especially to provide security, to
allow the
delivery of
humanitarian aid, and to eliminate weapons of mass
destruction”;
•
would
provide security, facilitate the return of refugees, maintain law
and order,
eliminate
terrorist infrastructure and resources and promote accountability
for
crimes
committed by the previous regime;
192
Minutes, 8
May 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.
193
Letter
Negroponte and Greenstock to Akram, 8 May 2003,
[untitled].
194
Public
hearing, 15 December 2009, page 31.
195
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 7 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s
Conversations with Colin Powell,
7
May’.
196
Letter
Negroponte and Greenstock to Akram, 8 May 2003,
[untitled].
184