1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
•
UNSCOM had
“arrived at an assessment … that Iraq’s declarations on
the
unilateral
destruction of the special warheads did not match all the
physical
evidence”.
Iraq was asked to discuss the issue on 3 August.
•
UNSCOM and
Iraq had been “able to identify jointly steps to clarify some of
the
problems
related to Iraq’s actions of 1991 to hide special warheads”, but
the
effort was
terminated by Iraq on 30 July when it refused to provide
access to
relevant
sites or to discuss the issue any further.
•
There were
outstanding issues relating to the remnants of “some
50
conventional
warheads … that have not been recovered”. Some 30 of those
had
been
indigenously produced.
570.
In relation to
missiles, the outstanding issues were:
•
Iraq’s
missile force was in possession of seven indigenously produced
missiles
in 1991.
Iraq maintained that they were training missiles which had
been
unilaterally
destroyed, but no remnants of the missiles or their engines
had
been found.
•
A team of
international experts had assessed in July that, by the end
of
1990, Iraq
had the capability to assemble a limited number of engines for
its
indigenously
produced proscribed missiles and Iraq should account for
the
key
components from that programme. A “rough material balance” had
been
developed
but additional verification work was recommended.
•
Iraq had
refused to address proscribed liquid missile
propellants.
•
Iraq
continued its development of the Al Samoud missile system which had
a
declared
range of less than 150km, but the issue of its reuse of Volga
engines
from
surface to air missiles was “unresolved”.
571.
In relation to
chemical weapons, outstanding issues were:
•
Iraq had
provided “only preliminary information” on its investigation of the
550
missing
155mm shells filled with mustard.
•
Accounting
for about 500 of the 1,000 bombs unilaterally destroyed was
“not
possible
owing to the state and extent of destruction”. UNSCOM wanted to
verify
the maximum
number of R-400 aerial bombs to facilitate the final
accounting
for chemical
bombs. The quantity and composition of biological bombs was
still
an
issue.
•
There were
“serious discrepancies” between Iraq’s declarations and the report
of
its
consumption of special munitions in the 1980s.
•
UNSCOM’s
view was that Iraq was “certainly able to produce VX, and
probably
produced it
in quantity”. There was “significant doubt” about Iraq’s claim that
it
had not
weaponised VX.
•
Iraq had
provided clarification of the production equipment removed from
al-
Muthanna in
July 1998 but field verification had been “blocked” since
5 August.
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