The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
667.
In his Weekly
Assessment of the same date, Mr Asquith wrote:
“Iraqi
feelings that their sovereignty is being bruised by MNF actions are
increasingly
prominent …
Resentment about MNF actions will inevitably extend to
questioning
their
authorities and then their presence … Acceleration of the PIC
timetable is now
back on the
table, having disappeared temporarily under the welter of activity
related
to the BSP
[Baghdad Security Plan]. The impact of this mood on our plans for
Basra,
MNF ability
to carry out operations against more sensitive Shia/Iranian
targets, the
June review
of SCR 1723 and thereafter on any chances of a successor SCR at
the
end of the
year … is obvious. I don’t detect from Maliki any problems (yet)
with our
Basra
timetable – though he is said to be seething at reporting in the
Arabic press,
drawing on
press briefing in London, implying that we would be prepared to
repeat
the Jameat
and NIAA operations if a further such opportunity
arose.”352
668.
On 10 March, a
meeting of countries neighbouring Iraq and the five
Permanent
Members of
the UN Security Council was held in Baghdad.353
Attending
for the UK
alongside
Mr McDonald, Mr Asquith reported:
“Maliki’s
opening address … sought to reassure participants that the
GoI
[Government
of Iraq] was determined to tackle sectarian violence, but
emphasised
the common
interest in a stable Iraq … Delegates were constructive and
supportive
in their
interventions and the tone of discussions was genuinely
positive.
“A common
theme was support for the GoI’s efforts to overcome the challenges.
Iran
sought a
timetable for the withdrawal of MNF‑I as they were part of the
problem not
the
solution … France and Syria also sought a timetable for MNF‑I
withdrawal.”
669.
The IPU
reported to Dr Howells that the meeting had failed to resolve the
format,
location
and timing of a follow‑up meeting of Ministers.354
670.
The day after
the neighbours meeting, Lt Gen Lamb reported that there had
been
a shift in
focus within the MNF‑I leadership, with greater recognition of the
potential
opportunities
offered by the engagement/reconciliation framework.355
671.
Lt Gen Lamb
wrote that Gen Petraeus had been “seriously taken” with the
quality
of the
small UK team that was working on this which, combined with the US
specialists,
had made a
significant impact. The results of co‑operation in Sadr City were
looking
promising,
with around 1,000 MNF and ISF soldiers entering without a shot
fired the
previous
week.
352
eGram
9559/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 8 March 2007, ‘Iraq: Weekly
Assessment’.
353
eGram
9887/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 11 March 2007, ‘Iraq: Baghdad
Meeting of Neighbouring
Countries
and P5, 10 March’.
354
Minute
Plato/IPU [junior official] to Casey/Howells, 12 March 2007, ‘Iraq
Neighbours Meeting,
Baghdad’,
10 March 2007.
355
Minute Lamb
to CDS, 11 March 2007, ‘SBMR‑I Weekly Report (247) 11 Mar
07’.
124