11.1 |
De-Ba’athification
to that
will have to be the top levels of the instruments of repression –
the security,
intelligence
organisations etc.
“Some
politicians … are arguing that the fourth level of the party …
should also
be
included. This would extend the numbers to some 30,000 possibly
more. The
argument in
favour is that this is the level where party officials began to
receive
privileges
such as free housing and thus were identified popularly as
beneficiaries
of the
regime. Against that is the danger that too wide a list will be
hard to
administer;
that we should not exclude too large a group from the new
system;
and it
would increase the risk of false accusations against innocent
people …
“Grateful
for early views on this issue. My own instinct is we should not
throw the net
wider than
necessary, and that for now we could settle on the top three tiers
… But
I frankly
don’t have sufficient feel for the Iraqi Ba’ath Party to know the
level at which
real evil
began.”
37.
The following
day, Mr Sawers reported that Ambassador Bremer’s staff in the
CPA
had a
“similar [approach to de‑Ba’athification] to ours, and they share
our uncertainty
over how
wide to cast the net”.24
In
particular, “banning all party members from any of
the top
three tiers in ministries” could inadvertently exclude “many of the
technocrats we
will want
to re‑employ”. Ambassador Bremer had explained that the steer he
was getting
from
Mr Donald Rumsfeld, US Defense Secretary, and President Bush
was to “spread
the net
widely initially, and then to allow exceptions without too many
obstacles”.
38.
On 13 May,
Sir David Manning met Dr Rice and other National Security
Council
staff in
Washington.25
A report of
the meeting by Mr Rycroft said that Sir David
had
gone
through the points raised by Mr Sawers on de‑Ba’athification,
and the NSC team
had agreed
with them. They told Sir David that the US had agreed a
de‑Ba’athification
strategy
the previous week.
39.
The following
day, the FCO in London sent Mr Sawers the instructions he
had
requested.26
The FCO
wrote:
“… there
should be a [de‑Ba’athification] process, but its scope should be
limited,
and there
needs to be room for discretion.
“We agree
that the net should not be cast too wide. Excluding the top three
ranks
from public
service … is probably the most practical approach … In certain
cases,
particularly
in the security services, Ba’ath members may have to be moved
aside
in order
to provide … reassurance, whatever their position in the party. But
we do
not want to
create a large underground of disaffected Ba’athists who see no
possible
future for
themselves in post‑Saddam Iraq … So the short answer to the
question
24
Telegram 6
IraqRep to FCO London, 13 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Putting Things
Right’.
25
Telegram
643 Washington to FCO London, 13 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Meetings with
Rice and Cheney,
13
May’.
26
Telegram 2
FCO London to IraqRep, 14 May 2003, ‘Iraq:
de‑Ba’athification’.
9