The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
was that
the MNF presence was a distorting factor which caused the ISF to be
seen as
collaborators
rather than nationalists.
1397.
The officials
suggested withdrawing the UK’s presence from the PJCC at
the
same time
as Basra Palace, given the threat to UK personnel. The paper
stated:
“When we
leave the PJCC, our Security Sector Reform work there will cease
…
But in
our judgement, these downsides are outweighed by the risks in
remaining at
the site.
And the PJCC is no longer as crucial a centre for the Iraqi
Security Forces,
since Mohan
moved the Basra Operations Centre to the Shatt Al‑Arab Hotel.
We
therefore
recommend that we plan to remove all UK personnel from the site
in
parallel
with leaving Basra Palace.”
1398.
Recalling the
looting that occurred when the UK vacated Camp Abu Naji
in
Maysan, the
paper stated that it was “critical” that the UK did not leave until
a “credible
Iraqi Guard
Force” was in place. That would be ready by the end of
August.
1399.
The paper
described US concerns about transition:
“They [the
US] are intensely nervous about transition in Basra. They believe
the
local Iraqi
Security Forces are not robust enough to handle security without
our
direct
support.”
1400.
On the future
for Basra, the paper stated that there might be “an initial period
in
which the
Iraqi Security Forces faced challenges to their authority from
militia groups”
and that
“There will be weaknesses at the leadership level in the Iraqi
Security Forces.”
1401.
In an annex to
the paper, there was an assessment of Basra province
against
the
conditions for PIC, one of which was “the Iraqi Security Forces’
capacity to maintain
order and
conduct counter insurgency operations”. The paper reiterated
concerns about
the
“vulnerability [of 10th Division] to political pressure when
operating in Basra” and
stated that
it was likely that that would continue leading to them refusing to
confront JAM
independently.
The Basra IPS was “on target” to meet the PIC criteria with 93
percent
of stations
assessed at TRA level 2 or higher. It then reiterated concerns
about public
confidence,
militia infiltration and the requirement for institutional
reform.
1402.
Another annex
addressed future UK ambitions in Basra. The military plan
was
that 950
troops would be assigned to SSR and “rear area tasks such as border
patrols”.
The
military would also assist in maintaining an acceptable security
environment to
enable SSR
activities.
1403.
On 6 August,
the British Embassy Baghdad reported on the MCNS meeting
held
the
previous day.1285
Mr Qadar,
the Minister of Defence, was impressed with the
“positive
impact”
that Gen Mohan and Maj Gen Jalil had made on the
security situation in Basra
1285
eGram
33092/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 6 August 2007, ‘Iraq: Ministerial
Committee on National
Security, 5
August’.
380