9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
•
a “decision
to sign” the Accountability and Justice Law (formerly
the
de‑Ba’athification
Law), which had been passed by the Council of
Representatives
(see Section 11.1).
757.
Mr Prentice
observed: “The simultaneous intent to cut posts and broaden
the
coalition
creates obvious difficulty in satisfying all demands.”
758.
On 24 January,
Maj Gen Binns reported that he had briefed Lt Gen Odierno on
“the
key
elements of the mission for the first half on 2008” in
MND(SE).363
They agreed
that
it was
right for MND(SE) to be a command in support of the Iraqi
Government, ISF, FCO
and PRT. Lt
Gen Odierno confirmed that Maysan remained an ongoing concern.
Maj
Gen Binns
judged that:
“… the US
command in Iraq are seriously concerned about the lack of
MNF
presence/control
in Dhi Qar and Maysan. We may employ the argument that
the
provinces
have been PIC’d and that we MND(SE) are in strategic overwatch, but
this
doesn’t
convince US Commanders.”
759.
Maj Gen Binns
told Lt Gen Houghton:
“I should
therefore be grateful for your direction on what the UK position is
regarding
the
potential transfer of Dhi Qar, Maysan and Muthanna provinces to
another MND’s
area of
responsibility and the line I should take in discussions
…”
760.
Mr Brown
and President Bush discussed Iraq briefly during a video
conference
on 24
January.364
Mr Brown
considered that Iraq appeared to have turned a corner;
progress on
key legislation and a change in mindset were
encouraging.
On 25
January, the MOD published a report of the army’s investigation
into cases of
“deliberate
abuse and unlawful killings of civilians in Iraq in 2003 and early
2004” by
UK Service
Personnel.365
It included
the case of Mr Baha Mousa.
The Aitken
Report summarised
what had happened in Iraq, and steps taken since 2003
to
prevent
similar events recurring. It concluded:
“The fact
that these measures were not introduced in advance of the invasion
of Iraq
may suggest
a lack of awareness of the operational context by those responsible
for
preparing
our people for that operation, and thus a failing. At one level,
the paucity of
planning
for nation-rebuilding after the invasion (a consequence, in part,
of the need
to give
last-minute diplomacy a chance of success) was certainly a factor.
Uncertainty
over the
reaction of the Iraqi people to being invaded was probably another;
in some
363
Minute
Binns to CJO, 24 January 2008, ‘GOC MND(SE) Weekly Letter – 24
January 2008’.
364
Letter
Fletcher to Gould, 24 January 2008, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with
Bush, 24 January’.
365
The Aitken
Report: An Investigation into Cases of Deliberate Abuse and
Unlawful Killing in Iraq in 2003
and
2004, 25 January
2008.
321