3.6 | Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January 2003

915. Mr Campbell wrote that he had wanted to get President Bush “as close as possible

to a second resolution” and to “tone down the rush‑to‑war talk”.296

916. Mr Campbell added that there had been debate about what to say about a second

resolution. The White House Press Secretary had been opposed to the idea that

President Bush should say he was “open” to a second resolution because “that would be

seen as a shift in US policy”. President Bush had been impatient and the messages had

not been “properly prepared”.

917. In Mr Campbell’s view:

“The overall impression was poor. TB didn’t really answer the question about

the second resolution. And though Bush said it would be ‘welcome’ he looked

uncomfortable and the body language was poor … Even though the words were

kind of OK, the overall impression was not.”

918. Mr Campbell’s decision to give journalists travelling to Washington with Mr Blair

a report, ‘Iraq – its Infrastructure of Concealment, Deception and Intimidation’,297 and

the content of the report which became the subject of considerable controversy, is

addressed in Section 4.3.

919. Accounts published by President Bush and Vice President Cheney

demonstrate that there were serious reservations about pursuing a second

resolution and whether it was achievable.

920. In his memoir President Bush wrote that Mr Blair had gone to Washington “for a

strategy session”. They had “agreed” that Saddam Hussein had “violated” resolution

1441 “by submitting a false declaration”; and that they “had ample justification to enforce

the ‘serious consequences’”.298

921. President Bush added that Mr Blair:

“… wanted to go back to the UN for a second resolution clarifying that Iraq had

‘failed to take the final opportunity afforded to it’.

“‘It’s not that we need it’ Tony said. ‘A second resolution gives military and

political protection.’”

922. President Bush wrote that he “dreaded the thought of plunging back into the UN”

and that Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld and Dr Rice “were opposed”.

Secretary Powell had told him that “we didn’t need another resolution and probably

couldn’t get one”. President Bush added that if Mr Blair “wanted a second resolution,

296 Campbell A & Hagerty B. The Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power: Countdown

to Iraq. Hutchinson, 2012.

297 Report [No.10], January 2003, ‘Iraq – Its Infrastructure of Concealment, Deception and Intimidation’.

298 Bush GW. Decision Points. Virgin Books, 2010.

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