6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
should be a
“top priority” in post-Saddam Hussein contingency planning. Mr
Blair would
have to
pursue the issue with President Bush if the UK was to have any
impact.
560.
Sir
Christopher returned to the same theme during November, in the
context of
Iraqi oil
contracts. The issue of oil contracts is addressed later in this
Section.
561.
DFID commented
on the importance of learning from DFID and
inter-departmental
experience
elsewhere.299
Areas to
consider included: SSR; civil-military co-ordination
(CIMIC);
DDR; economic recovery; UN co-ordination structures; donor
financing; and the
role of
IFIs.
562.
Some minor
changes were made to the version of the FCO paper submitted
to
the AHGI
on 11 October, including the addition of a reference to the need to
plan on
the basis
that there would have to be “a major international effort, possibly
for an
563.
On 26
September, Mr Richard Haass, State Department Director of
Policy
Planning,
produced a 15-page policy paper on Iraq reconstruction for
Secretary
Powell.301
Mr Haass
described the paper, reproduced in full in War
of Necessity, War of
Choice,
as “the
largest single project we undertook during my tenure at Policy
Planning”.
The paper
was built on “an in-depth examination of the lessons of US
experiences with
nation
building throughout the twentieth century” and concluded
with:
“Seven
Lessons for Iraq
•
We must
decide on the scale of our ambitions in Iraq, recognizing that
goals
that go
beyond disarmament and regional stability and seek to build
democracy,
prosperity,
and good governance will require a heavy commitment in
resources,
military
involvement and diplomatic engagement. The strategic importance
of
Iraq points
toward ambitious long-term goals …
•
We must
prevent a security vacuum from emerging in Iraq that could
be
exploited
by internal spoilers, encourage external meddlers, and
preclude
reconstruction
and humanitarian efforts …
•
We should
help formulate specific plans to transform the UN
Oil-for-Food
program
into a mechanism that will simultaneously support the
humanitarian
needs of
the Iraqi people, fund the broader reconstruction effort, and
address
outside
claimants’ justified interests … At the same time, the United
States
should
avoid taking ‘ownership’ of the Iraqi oil industry.
299
Letter
Conflict & Humanitarian Affairs Dept [junior official] to Gray,
4 October 2002, ‘After Saddam’.
300
Paper FCO,
[undated, version received at AHGI, 11 October 2002], ‘Scenarios
for the future of Iraq
after
Saddam’.
301
Haass
RN. War of
Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of two Iraqi
Wars. Simon
& Schuster, 2009.
207