12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
911.
In
Dr Hutton’s update to Mr Hoon of 24 March (described
earlier in this Section),
Dr Hutton
warned of risks that other aspects of SSR were lagging behind the
Iraqi Army
and of a
requirement for further funding since there were “constraints on
GCPP funding
for
existing policing projects beyond the next six months, and no
identified resources for
additional
policing effort”.865
912.
Dr Hutton
advised that SSR required the “sufficient and appropriate
investment
of UK
financial resources”. Work was under way to develop a coherent plan
for the
financial
year 2005/06 which would form the basis of a request to Treasury
for support
from the
Reserve. The plan was to be aligned with other government
departments and
sources of
funding from others, including the US.
913.
On 29 April, a
Force Level Review by the MOD recommended an increase
of
535
personnel to “resource properly the Security Sector Reform (SSR)
task” which
was where
the “main effort” lay.866
Of the 27
military sub‑units (each of around 100
personnel)
that would be in MND(SE) following the troop rotation, only four
were to be
fully
dedicated to SSR and a further 12 available would provide some
input when their
primary
tasks allowed.
914.
On 15 June, an
official in PJHQ wrote to Dr Reid to highlight ongoing
discussions
with
Treasury for an additional £38m867
to fund a
successor programme to Project
OSIRIS.868
The bulk of
expenditure would be spent on mobility and the remainder on
ISF
training
infrastructure, communications, logistics and command and control
functions.
The
Treasury had taken “a close interest” and was keen to ensure that
there was “no
duplication”
with funding allocated to the FCO and DFID.
915.
The official
in PJHQ wrote that Project OSIRIS had been “a success”.
The
10th Division
could “deploy battalions with all four of their rifle companies
correctly
armed and
equipped” and had improved communications equipment. The IPS,
who
“bear the
brunt of the violence in the region”, were correctly armed, wore
body armour
and were
able to communicate at a local level when on duty. The border
police were
also armed
correctly and had basic communications equipment.
916.
Dr Reid
responded on 23 June, acknowledging that expenditure on SSR
and
military‑led
reconstruction had been judged as a success and confirming that he
was
content for
negotiations with the Treasury for the additional funding to be
pursued.869
865
Minute
Hutton to APS/SofS [MOD], 24 March 2005, ‘Iraqi Self‑Reliance and
Strategic Intent’.
866
DG
Op Pol to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 29 April 2005, ‘Iraq:
UK Roulement and Force
Level Review’.
867
The full
request was for £58m, £20m of which was requested for the Civil
Effects Fund.
868
Minute
Scholefieldt to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 15 June 2005, ‘Funding
for a Further Programme
of Security
Sector Reform and a Civil Effects Fund for MND(SE)’.
869
Minute
APS/SofS [MOD] to Command Secretary PJHQ, 23 June 2005, ‘Iraq:
Funding for a Further
Programme
of Security Sector Reform and a Civil Effects Fund for
MND(SE)’.
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