The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
129.
Mr Blair
told President Bush on 16 December that the Iraqi declaration
was
“patently
false”.45
He was
“cautiously optimistic” that the inspectors would find
proof.
130.
In a statement
issued on 18 December, Mr Straw said that Saddam Hussein
had
decided to
continue the pretence that Iraq had no WMD programme. If he
persisted
“in this
obvious falsehood” it would become clear that he had “rejected the
pathway
131.
The JIC’s
initial Assessment of the Iraqi declaration on 18 December
stated
that there
had been “No serious attempt” to answer any of the unresolved
questions
highlighted
by the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) or to refute any of the
points
made in the
UK dossier on Iraq’s WMD programme.47
132.
President Bush
is reported to have told a meeting of the US National
Security
Council on
18 December 2002, at which the US response to Iraq’s
declaration was
discussed,
that the point of the 7 December declaration was to test
whether Saddam
Hussein
would accept the “final opportunity” for peace offered by the
Security Council.48
He had
summed up the discussion by stating:
“We’ve got
what we need now, to show America that Saddam won’t disarm
himself.”
133.
Mr Colin
Powell, the US Secretary of State, stated on 19 December that
Iraq was
“well on
its way to losing its last chance”, and that there was a “practical
limit” to how
long the
inspectors could be given to complete their work.49
134.
Mr Straw
told Secretary Powell on 30 December that the US and UK
should
develop a
clear “plan B” postponing military action on the basis that
inspections plus
the threat
of force were containing Saddam Hussein.50
135.
In early 2003,
Mr Straw still thought a peaceful solution was more likely
than
military
action. Mr Straw advised Mr Blair on 3 January that
he had concluded that, in
the
potential absence of a “smoking gun”, there was a need to consider
a “Plan B”.51
The
UK should
emphasise to the US that the preferred strategy was peaceful
disarmament.
136.
Mr Blair
took a different view. By the time he returned to the office on
4 January
2003, he
had concluded that the “likelihood was war” and, if conflict could
not be
avoided,
the right thing to do was fully to support the US.52
He was
focused on the need
45
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 16 December 2002, ‘Prime Minister’s
Telephone Call with President Bush,
16 December’.
46
The
National Archives, 18 December 2002, Statement
by Foreign Secretary on Iraq Declaration.
47
JIC
Assessment, 18 December 2002, ‘An Initial Assessment of Iraq’s
WMD Declaration’.
48
Feith
DJ. War and
Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on
Terrorism.
HarperCollins, 2008.
49
US
Department of State Press Release, Press
Conference Secretary of State Colin L Powell,
Washington,
19 December 2002.
50
Letter
Straw to Manning, 30 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Colin Powell, 30 December’.
51
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 3 January 2003, ‘Iraq – Plan
B’.
52
Note Blair
[to No.10 officials], 4 January 2003, [extract
‘Iraq’].
588