3.8  |  Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March 2003

968.  The Note added that the JIC continued to judge that Saddam Hussein’s scope

for “extreme and unpredictable action is increasing as the prospect of an attack

approaches”. The JIC view on the possible use of CBW is set out in Section 4.3.

969.  Sir David Manning spoke to Dr Rice at noon.341

970.  Sir David told Dr Rice that the French had “launched a fierce public attack” on

the UK.

971.  Sir David and Dr Rice also discussed the meeting of the Security Council and

the need to rebuild relationships. Sir David said that Dr Blix’s work programme provided

“further confirmation of how little Saddam had done to fulfil his disarmament obligations”.

The UK was in favour of a continuing role for UNMOVIC; it would be “important to have

UNMOVIC available to provide independent verification when we found WMD”.

972.  Mr Blair and President Bush spoke at 12.40pm on 19 March.342 They discussed

the military plans and timetable. Mr Blair said that he had “reviewed the military plans

and was confident that they would work”. Post-conflict issues would be the focus of

conversation when they met. A full-day meeting was envisaged to cover the ground.

Mr Blair suggested that the discussions might include bringing in allies who had opposed

military action and co-ordinating a communications strategy.

973.  Mr Campbell wrote in his diaries:

“As Bush said … other leaders would look at what he [Blair] did, and the power with

which he did it, and really learn lessons from it. ‘Landslide’ he [Bush] said, referring

to the Road Map publication as ‘genius’. He referred back to what he called ‘the

cojones conference’ at Camp David. ‘You showed cojones, you never blinked.

A leader who leads will win and you are a real leader.’ He said the object is regime

change … TB felt that the next stage after winning the war would be to work out the

geopolitical fallout and repair some of the divisions. Bush said Condi had this line

that we should ‘punish the French, ignore the Germans and forgive the Russians’,

which was pretty glib. TB didn’t comment at the time but later said he didn’t agree.

We should try to build bridges with all of them. We finally got Bush to agree there

was no point TB going to the US at the moment, that we should wait until the

fighting starts …

“… Bush said that the Iraqis would now be ‘shredding documents like crazy’…

the Road Map would be published today when Abu Mazen was confirmed …”343

341  Letter Manning to McDonald, 19 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi Rice’.

342  Letter Cannon to McDonald, 19 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with Bush, 19 March’.

343  Campbell A & Hagerty B. The Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power: Countdown

to Iraq. Hutchinson, 2012.

573