The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
436.
In its
Assessment of 19 February 2003, the JIC stated that: “Reporting
has
previously
indicated that the regime is concerned about a Shia uprising in the
South
after the
outbreak of hostilities.” Recent reporting had confirmed its
judgements that
the Shia
would be:
“… cautious
in opposing Saddam until they see the regime is finished and
its
capability
to retaliate is substantially weakened. The experience of 1991 will
be a
major
influence … Even if the initial severity of any Coalition attack
makes clear
that the
regime is finished, the Shia may still fear what the regime could
do to them
in its
dying days … Overall we judge there will
be no immediate, unified Shia
response to a
Coalition attack.”
437.
The Assessment
stated that:
“Given the
Shia in southern Iraq have borne the brunt of regime oppression
since
1991, there
is a high probability of revenge killing of Ba’ath officials, both
Sunni
and Shia.
This could be particularly widespread and bloody, if the regime
collapses
quickly and
few Ba’ath officials have the chance to escape … the extent of
any
further
breakdown of law and order is difficult to predict. But there will
be large
numbers of
armed groups and some potential for tribal score settling …
Overall
there is a
risk of a wider breakdown as the regime’s authority crumbles. There
are
no
indications … of Shia preparations for an all-out civil war against
Sunni Iraqis.”
438.
The JIC also
assessed:
“We know
very little about the Iraqi Shia. […] they are not politically
organised above
the local,
tribal level and there are no clear candidates for overall Shia
leadership.
They are
very diverse, straddling the urban/rural and secular/Islamist
divides.
They have
had little opportunity to discuss their preferred political
arrangements.
Shia
politics post-Saddam therefore look highly
unpredictable.”
439.
In relation to
Iraq’s response, the Assessment stated that there was:
“… no
conclusive intelligence on Iraqi plans but they could:
•
defend oil
wells against attack;
•
set fire to
them to stop production, cause pollution and disrupt
Coalition
Forces;
and
•
cause
long-term, possibly irreparable, damage to prevent others
from
benefitting
from future production.
“The
potential environmental disaster, coupled with the possible use of
CBW …
could cause
widespread panic and contamination. This could result in hundreds
of
thousands
of displaced persons and refugees, many needing immediate
help.
“…
[I]nterruption of food supplies … could boost the number of
refugees and
displaced
persons throughout Iraq … Tackling such problems in southern Iraq
will
452