14.1 |
Military equipment (post-conflict)
801.
Maj Gen Salmon
wrote in his post‑tour report:
“The
determination of the most appropriate mobility platform for any
environment
requires a
delicate balance between speed, manoeuvrability, firepower
and
protection.
Presentational constraints over the employment of Snatch were
well
understood
and acknowledged. Nonetheless, while offering good protection,
Mastiff
generated
other risks: heightened profile; regular collateral damage (with
associated
cost to
local approval) while manoeuvring in tight confines; and an
inability to keep
up with ISF
HMMVs [Iraqi Security Forces’ Humvees] in the City. This was set
in
the context
of CG MNF‑I’s (Gen Petraeus) determination that troops should
‘get out
and walk’ –
in order to influence the population directly. The solution was
found in
a command
decision to strip MiTTs down to the bare minimum and travel with
Iraqi
counterparts
in ISF in Iraqi vehicles. The ability to mentor improved
immediately and
markedly
and the level of protection afforded by ISF paintwork arguably
exceeds
that of CF
protective technology. It worked well.”420
802.
Maj Gen Salmon
said that that was a “defining decision” for building
relationships
but that
“the UK political sensitivities over any trade off between
protection and
manoeuvre
should not be underestimated”. He added: “Strategic risk aversion
over
casualties
was a real planning consideration that routinely shaped tactical
operations.”
803.
On 23 July, a
note about FRES highlighted the capability gap that would
remain
until FRES
was delivered:
“PPVs do
have some utility … but not in areas where they are likely to have
to
operate
within the range of enemy medium or heavy forces. PPVs do not meet
the
protection,
capacity, or tactical mobility requirements of FRES as a whole,
although
it is
possible that they could meet part of the requirement in the FRES
BCU [Basic
Capability
Utility] family …”421
“Current
operations show that we need to use a combination of armoured
vehicles
… and PPVs
… to operate in different roles, in different areas, to meet
different
circumstances.
However, PPVs are particularly important at the moment
because,
in many
cases, we have to use them where we would use FRES if it were
available.
Therefore
if FRES was in service now we would need to deploy fewer
PPVs.”
805.
In its review
of defence equipment for 2008, the House of Commons
Defence
Committee
outlined a number of concerns about the ongoing delays to the
FRES
420
Report
Salmon, 15 May 2009, ‘COMUKAMPHIBFOR Op TELIC 12/13 (HQ MND(SE))
Post Operational
Report
(POR)’.
421
Minute
DCI(A), 23 July 2007, ‘The Future Rapid Effect System (FRES) –
Information Note’.
137