3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
in view of
its past clandestine programmes of weapons of mass destruction and
its
past
pattern of co-operation. It is my hope that the commitments made
recently in
Baghdad
will continue to translate into concrete and sustained
action.”
384.
In the
discussion which followed the reports, significant differences
between
members of
the Security Council remained.
385.
Mr de
Villepin stated that the inspectors should be given time to fulfil
their
mission and
a further meeting to assess the situation should be held on 14
March.
386.
France did
not exclude a resort to force but it could be justified “only”
if
inspections
failed. The Council would “have to take a decision” if the
inspectors
reported it
was impossible to continue.
387.
The reports
from Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei were followed by a
discussion in the
Security
Council on 14 February.105
388.
The points
made by Mr de Villepin included:
•
In adopting
resolution 1441 the Council had collectively agreed two
stages:
“disarmament
through inspections and, if this strategy should fail,
consideration
by the
Security Council of all the options, including resorting to force”.
A second
resolution
could be justified “only” if inspections failed.
•
France did
not believe the option of inspections had “been exhausted”, it
could
“provide an
effective response to the imperative of disarming
Iraq”.
•
The use of
force would “have such heavy consequences for the
people,
the region
and international stability that it should be envisaged
only
as a last resort”.
•
Inspections
were producing results, although each member of the
Council
“would like
more” and pressure on Baghdad should be maintained to
achieve that.
•
Real
progress was being made. Aerial reconnaissance had been agreed.
Iraq
had allowed
interviews without minders. Draft legislation barring activities
linked
to
programmes for weapons of mass destruction was being adopted. Iraq
was
providing a
list of experts who witnessed the programmes of destruction in
1991.
•
France had
set out proposals to enhance the efficiency of inspections and
would
be
providing additional resources.
•
War might
seem to be the swiftest option in ensuring Iraqi compliance,
but
building
peace would be long and difficult. No one could maintain that war
would
“lead to a
safer, more just and more stable world”; war was “always the
outcome
of
failure”.
105
UN Security
Council, ‘4707th Meeting Friday 14 February 2003’
(S/PV.4707).
249