4.1 |
Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
to rebuild
dedicated chemical weapons or large scale biological
weapons
production
capabilities would be constrained, it would be able to
use
civil
industry to
produce chemical and biological agents. UN
monitoring would,
however,
act as a deterrent
to Iraqi development of its nuclear ambitions.
•
Without
both economic sanctions and UN monitoring, Iraq would
accelerate
its
WMD and
missile programmes. It could
produce new 650km range missiles
within a
year. But it would take at least
five years to make a crude nuclear
device and a
further two to manufacture a nuclear warhead for
missiles.”
41.
The
conclusions on Iraq’s WMD are set out in the Box
below.
The
residual threat from WMD
Assessing
whether there was a “residual
threat” from
Iraq’s WMD, the JIC stated that
“most of
[its] ballistic
missiles, chemical weapons and nuclear
programme have been
destroyed”.
Iraq had claimed to have destroyed its biological weapons
capability but
that could
not be confirmed. It was “likely” that Iraq had a “residual
WMD and missile
capability”:
•
a “handful of
ageing SCUD-derived missiles
with a
range of up to
650km”
[the Al
Hussein] were “probably disassembled and concealed”. Those
“could be
re-assembled
quickly [‘within weeks’] and used (albeit with limited
accuracy)
against
targets in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and even Israel”;
•
“some
chemical and
biological agent may be
concealed, possibly weaponised”;
•
Iraq had
“developed a missile with a
range of 150km [the Al
Samoud], which
is
permitted under UN controls. Although not fully operational, this
could reach
Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia”; and
•
Iraq was
“converting the L-29 jet trainer aircraft into a crude
remotely
piloted
vehicle
which could
carry an explosive, chemical or biological weapon to
Kuwait
and against
other targets in the northern Gulf”.
Prospects
for the future
The JIC
stated that “in the absence of UN inspectors”, since December 1998,
Iraq had:
•
“… increased
the pace and scope of its missile
research and
development
programmes.
Series production” of
the Al Samoud missile “could begin
within
months”. A
“longer range version (up to 200km)” was “being worked
on”.
•
There was “no
evidence” of a revival in the Al Hussein programme.
•
“According to
intelligence preliminary work” was “under way on another
missile
with a
possible range of over 700km”.
•
Intelligence
suggested “some biological
and
chemical
warfare
activity”. Iraq was
“rebuilding
its civil chemical industry, including facilities formerly
associated with
chemical
weapons”.
17