The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

• how best to maximise pressure on Iraqi political leaders to hold a further meeting

of the “1 plus 3” group (the Executive Group); and

• how the UK could offer troops in theatre greater access to the internet.223

464.  Government officials working closely with the military met JAM1’s lawyer

on 3 October, who told them that Muqtada al-Sadr had told JAM1 not to advance

negotiations with the UK any further.224

465.  The lawyer argued that JAM1 himself should be released so that he could

convince al-Sadr in person of the need to continue. This request was not repeated by

JAM1 who met the officials later the same day. He indicated that he would send a letter

setting out the case for the negotiations to al-Sadr, whose instruction did not yet reflect

a final decision.

466.  Sir John Scarlett discussed Iraq with Mr McDonald on 3 October.225 Mr McDonald

said that he and Mr Brown were aware of the fragility of the situation in Basra. They did

not necessarily think this affected PIC: that was a political decision and the timing had

been in view for several months, since before negotiations with JAM1 began.

467.  On 4 October, a government official specialising in the Middle East reported on a

meeting chaired by Mr Day originally intended to discuss a negotiating framework but

which had been extended to cover immediate threats to the deal.226 The official’s report

of the discussion said:

“… there was a general complacency that the cease-fire was in the bag for as long

as we had detainees to release. Emerging British policy in Basra was based on the

firm fact of the cease-fire.”

468.  If the cease-fire were to collapse, the official reported that Mr Day’s concerns were

casualties, presentational difficulties for the Prime Minister, and difficulty in getting PIC

approved: the “overriding aim of HMG’s policy in MND(SE)”.

469.  The immediate aim of negotiation therefore “had to be to sustain the cease-fire

until we got to PIC”. A submission, a draft of which was already circulating, would be put

to Ministers setting out the short-term challenge and the potential risks of linking the UK

Government’s success in Basra to JAM. Negotiations would be likely to confer a degree

of legitimacy on JAM1, the long-term implications of which were not obvious.

223  Letter Fletcher to Forber, 3 October 2007, ‘Prime Minister’s Visit to Iraq, 2 October’.

224  Email government official working closely with the military, 4 October 2007, ‘[NAME OF OPERATION]

Meeting with [JAM1] on 3 October’.

225  Minute C, 3 October 2007, C’s Meeting with Simon McDonald, 3 October 2007’.

226  Email government official specialising in the Middle East, 4 October 2007, ‘[NAME OF OPERATION]:

Sustaining the Ceasefire’.

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