13.1 | Resources

625. Mr Stephen Pattison, FCO Director International Security, wrote to Rear Admiral

Tim Laurence, MOD Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Resources and Plans)

on 18 September to provide a formal response to the tasking given at the 6 June

meeting.388

626. Mr Pattison advised that for Afghanistan, departments had agreed to create

a ring‑fenced budget for QIPs within the GCPP Afghanistan Strategy, using existing

funding from that strategy and an additional £3m from DFID.

627. In Iraq, UK commanders had been able to secure an “unusually generous”

proportion of US CERPs funding since the 6 June meeting. The GCPP Iraq Strategy

had also been boosted by additional funds from the GCPP Reserve and departments to

support the Better Basra Plan. If additional funding for QIPs was required, departments

had agreed to “follow the Afghanistan model”. That would mean seeking additional

funding first through the GCPP Iraq Strategy and from the GCPP Reserve, before

approaching the Treasury for additional funds.

628. Rear Admiral Laurence had earlier advised the FCO, in response to sight of a

draft of Mr Pattison’s letter, that the first reaction of the Chiefs of Staff might be that

departments had ducked a battle with the Treasury.389

629. Ministers agreed on 9 January 2007 that the UK needed a capability to intervene

to prevent conflict and build capacity after conflicts.390

630. In response, on 15 February, the Cabinet Office produced a paper which

considered how to improve the UK civilian contribution to conflict management and

prevention.391

631. The Cabinet Office advised that funding “high priority and Ministerial endorsed

policy objectives which cross the boundaries of existing responsibilities” had been a

particular challenge. Funding for civilian activity in Iraq and Afghanistan, such as the

Better Basra Plan:

“… had to be negotiated across a range of departments and budget holders, with

time consuming turf battles, diverting effort that would have been better deployed

on developing effective policies, and delaying delivering.”

632. Conflict prevention activities were currently resourced in an “ad‑hoc fashion in and

between departments”, with limited transparency. There was no mechanism to “generate

the analysis to support a process of setting strategic priorities or to inform balance of

388 Letter Pattison to Laurence, 18 September 2006, ‘Quick Impact Projects (QIPs)’.

389 Letter Laurence to Link, 10 August 2006, ‘Quick Impact Projects’.

390 Paper Cabinet Office, 15 February 2007, ‘Nation Building and Conflict Prevention: Improving

UK Capabilities’.

391 Paper Cabinet Office, 15 February 2007, ‘Nation Building and Conflict Prevention: Improving

UK Capabilities’.

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