The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
776.
President
Chirac told Mr Blair that he would not support war
unless
Saddam Hussein
did something unacceptable.
777.
In a
conversation later on 28 January, President Chirac told
Mr Blair that the
French
position had not changed; they were “against war, unless Saddam did
something
unacceptable”.259
Although
Dr Blix had reported that Iraq was not
co‑operating,
Dr ElBaradei
had reported good co‑operation. War was “always the worst
outcome”.
Iraq had
very little WMD compared with North Korea. The desire to preserve
the
transatlantic link
had to be balanced against the costs of a war.
778.
Mr Blair
and President Chirac agreed that the inspectors should be given
more
time.
President Chirac thought that the inspectors would find nothing;
Mr Blair said it
would be
“serious if the inspectors continued to report insufficient
co‑operation, e.g. if
the Iraqis
refused interviews or denied proper access”. They agreed that, “in
that case,
a second
resolution would come into play”.
779.
President
Chirac welcomed Mr Blair’s offer to speak again after his
meeting with
President
Bush.
780.
Mr Rycroft
commented that President Chirac appeared:
“… to be
positioning himself to support a second resolution if the
inspectors find
WMD or are
denied access. But his straight ‘non’ to the Prime Minster’s
question
about
continued Iraqi non‑co‑operation shows the problem we shall have
with the
French if
we are in the scenario of arguing that a pattern of
non‑co‑operation is a
material
breach of 1441.”
781.
A minute from
Sir David Manning to Mr Blair records that President
Chirac had
refused to
accept a phone call from Mr Blair for the preceding two
weeks.260
782.
Mr de
Villepin spoke twice to Mr Straw on 29 January.
783.
In the first
conversation, Mr de Villepin questioned why military action
should
be used
against Iraq when 20‑30 other countries had chemical weapons. It
was
hard to explain
the threat posed by Iraq when there was almost no risk from
the
784.
Mr Straw’s
response focused on the process in resolution 1441 agreed by
the
UK and
France. In his view, there were “two key questions”:
“… was
there a material breach and what action should the international
community
take.
Blix’s report had shown that Iraq was in material breach according
to the
259
Letter
Rycroft to Sinclair, 28 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with Chirac,
28 January’.
260
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 26 January 2003,
‘UK/France’.
261
Telegram 21
FCO London to Paris, 29 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s
Conversation
with French
Foreign Minister, 29 January’.
140