4.2 | Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002

487. In his diaries, Mr Campbell recorded that, on 18 September, he also:

“… went through nuclear section with Julian Miller, which was OK. JS [Jack Straw]

was keen to keep in the very downbeat assessment.”242

488. In an email on 19 September, Mr Campbell recorded that he told Mr Miller:

“… it would be simpler to have just one clearer section on nuclear timelines, perhaps

along the following lines …

“It is impossible to be precise about nuclear timelines We can be clear however,

that provided sanctions and export controls remain in place and effective, it is

not possible for Iraq to develop nuclear weapons. This is because although they

have the expertise, the design data, the planning and the intent they do not have

the material necessary for the production of fissile material. This contrasts with

CW/BW, which they can produce indigenously. Even if sanctions were removed,

we assess that it would take up to five years for them to develop nuclear

weapons. The timelines are considerably shortened however if Iraq manages

to obtain fissile material illegally from overseas In these circumstances, the JIC

assessed in early 2002 that they could produce nuclear weapons in between

one and two years”.243

489. Mr Scarlett sent the draft dossier to Mr Campbell on 19 September.244

490. The minute was also sent to JIC members “on a personal basis, reflecting the

continuing sensitivity of the document and the imperative need to avoid leaks”.

They were asked to let Mr Scarlett have “any essential further comments on this draft

by 15:00 today”.

491. Mr Scarlett wrote:

“I should draw your attention to some changes to the Executive Summary reflecting

comments from the Foreign Office; to a simplified account of Saddam’s nuclear

programme; and to a restructuring of the final section on Saddam’s Iraq to bring out

the human rights issues more clearly. In particular you should note that we have

toned down the reference to aluminium tubes … and removed it from the Executive

Summary. This reflects some very recent exchanges on intelligence channels.

Finally, I have recast the conclusion to remove the chart, which a number of readers

considered to lack impact.”

242 Campbell A & Hagerty B. The Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power: Countdown

to Iraq. Hutchinson, 2012.

243 Email Hatfield to Scarlett, 19 September 2002, ‘Nuclear Section’.

244 Minute Scarlett to Campbell, 19 September 2002, ‘Iraqi WMD: Public Presentation of Intelligence

Material’ attaching Paper, 19 September 2002, ‘Iraq’s Programme for Weapons of Mass Destruction:

The Assessment of the British Government’.

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