11.1 |
De-Ba’athification
112.
In early
September, the GC told Ambassador Bremer that it had formed the
High
National
de‑Ba’athification Commission (DBC), under the chairmanship of
Dr Chalabi,
with
Mr Nuri al‑Maliki as his deputy.101
113.
On 17
September, Dr Chalabi reported to Ambassador Bremer that
the
Commission’s
first two decisions had been to rescind the exemptions that had
previously
been issued
to fourth‑tier Ba’athists and to extend the ban on public
employment to
include a
wider range of public activities, including the media.
114.
On 18
September, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, who had now arrived in Iraq,
reported
that the
GC’s de‑Ba’athification Council had approved a resolution calling
for the
immediate
firing of all high‑level Ba’ath Party members from Government
service:
“Bremer
urged the IGC to co‑ordinate with the Ministry of Education to
ensure that
the process
of teacher de‑Ba’athification was complete before the schools
re‑open
on 1
October. The general issue, which remains controversial, of how to
manage
exemptions
is one that the IGC will soon have to engage on.”102
115.
The following
day, Sir Jeremy commented:
“I find
Bremer’s readiness to push the senior Iraqis to the front very
interesting. We
Brits think
it the right tactic, but I expected more resistance from him. He
continues
to remind
the GC eg when they produce ‘decisions’ on … de‑Ba’athification
…
that only
he can sign things into law. But he does not seem fussed to be
losing the
substantive
initiative …”103
116.
By 2 October,
Sir Jeremy was reporting that the issue of de‑Ba’athification
had:
“… not
proceeded over the week, despite the mounting concerns of both
the
CPA and the
GC. The harder‑line end of the GC demanded that senior
remaining
Ba’athists
should be physically removed from the streets – not just their jobs
– and
quickly.
Bremer reminded them that the CPA were still worried about due
process,
but had yet
to receive clarification from the GC on what their recent decision
meant.
He asked
for decisions on this soon.”104
117.
On 4 November,
Ambassador Bremer signed CPA Memorandum No.7.105
118.
Memorandum
No.7 transferred responsibility for the implementation
of
de‑Ba’athification
to the GC, and enshrined in law the first two decisions of
Dr Chalabi’s
101
Dobbins J,
Jones SG, Runkle B & Mohandas S. Occupying
Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional
Authority.
RAND
Corporation, 2009.
102
Telegram
174 IraqRep to FCO London, 18 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Governing
Council Roundup’.
103
Telegram
175 IraqRep to FCO London, 19 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Political
Process’.
104
Telegram
195 IraqRep to FCO London, 2 October 2003, ‘Iraq: Governing Council
update 1 October’.
105
Coalition
Provisional Authority Memorandum Number 7, 4 November
2003.
25