14.1 | Military equipment (post-conflict)

• Poor administration of UORs in the UK had caused “a huge amount of work

in theatre”. He cited ECM as an example.177

357. Maj Gen Riley’s report also highlighted that a UOR had been raised for the

enhanced protection of Saxon vehicles.

358. On 8 June, Gen Walker directed that Lt Gen Fry should lead on a paper looking

at “the new IED threat” and the technical and tactical responses to it.178

359. The record of actions from the Chiefs of Staff meeting on 15 June indicated that

the paper would be produced on 17 June.179

360. Lieutenant General Robert Fulton, DCDS(EC), provided that paper on 20 June.180

He advised that the UK’s current capability was “largely ineffective” in MND(SE). A new

detector, due to enter service in December, was more effective, but “not suitable for

the protection of mobile patrols”. An airborne detection capability had been deployed to

MND(SE) but that also had its limitations.

361. Lt Gen Fulton asked the Chiefs of Staff to note those points but no solution or

further action was recommended. He stated that there was no complete solution to the

problem available.

362. On 21 June, DSTL submitted a report to the DIS on the performance of EFPs

against UK armour.181 It concluded that the weapons it had been asked to examine had

“greatly enhanced penetration capability” against those tested by DSTL in September

2004 and could overmatch the armour of a Warrior.

363. On 30 June, Major General James Dutton, who had succeeded Maj Gen Riley as

GOC MND(SE), recorded in his weekly letter that a PIR IED had been used in attacks in

MND(SE).182 He stated:

“We are not yet sure exactly what this means (although a link to Lebanese Hizballah,

possibly through Iran seems likely), but there is no doubt that the threat to our troops

has increased. I have confidence that work under way both here and in the UK to

address the threat is progressing as quickly as possible.”

364. Reflecting the preferred option identified in February of a PPV fleet comprising

624 Snatch 2 and 100 Vector vehicles, a business case to convert the remaining

312 vehicles to Snatch 2, at a cost of £21.5m, was put forward on 16 June.183

177 Report Riley, 10 June 2005, ‘Progress Report – Operation TELIC’.

178 Minutes, 8 June 2005, Chiefs of Staff meeting.

179 Minutes, 15 June 2005, Chiefs of Staff meeting.

180 Minute DCDS(EC) to COS, 20 June 2005, ‘Command Wire Improvised Explosive Devices –

Counter‑Measures’.

181 Report DSTL, 21 June 2005, ‘Performance of Explosively Formed Projectiles Against UK Armour’.

182 Report, 30 June 2005, CG MND(SE) Southern Iraq Update – 30 June 2005’.

183 Note DEC(SP), 16 June 2005, ‘SNATCH 2 Review Note – URD 1090’.

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