4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
declaration
“disposed of” the question of Iraq’s WMD holdings but that he could
not say
Iraq
definitely had WMD; there was more work to do and the ball was in
Iraq’s court.62
157.
Dr Blix and Dr
ElBaradei briefed members of the Security Council on 19
December
on
inspections in Iraq and their preliminary assessment of the Iraqi
declaration.63
158.
Dr Blix told
the Security Council on 19 December that, while
individual
governments
had stated they had evidence which contradicted Iraq’s denial
that
it had
weapons of mass destruction, UNMOVIC was not yet in a position to
give
a definitive view.
159.
In his
“necessarily provisional” comments on the Iraqi declaration, Dr
Blix stated
that Iraq
continued to state that there were no weapons of mass destruction
in Iraq
when
inspectors left in December 1998 and that none had “been designed,
procured,
produced or
stored in the period since then”. While individual governments had
stated
that they
had “convincing evidence to the contrary”, UNMOVIC was, at that
point,
“neither in
a position to confirm Iraq’s statements, nor in possession of
evidence
to disprove
it”.
160.
Dr Blix added
that, during the period between 1991 and 1998, Iraq had
submitted
many
declarations which had “proved inaccurate or incomplete or was
unsupported
or contradicted
by evidence”. Dr Blix stated:
“A
declaration cannot, if it stands alone, create confidence. The
listing of sites or
of persons,
the reporting of production, importation, destruction and
consumption
figures …
is not enough to create confidence that no weapons programmes
and
proscribed
items remain. The statements need to be supported by
documentation
or other
evidence. Only so do they become verifiable.”
161.
The overall
impression was that “not much new significant
information”
had been
provided which related to proscribed programmes; nor had “much
new
supporting
documentation or other evidence been submitted”. Iraq had provided
new
information on:
•
missile
activities, including a series of new projects at various stages
of
development,
which Iraq claimed were permitted;
•
a
short-range rocket manufactured using 81mm aluminium tubes;
and
•
the ‘Air
Force’ document relating to the consumption of chemical weapons in
the
Iraq/Iran
war.
62
Telegram
2411 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 18 December 2002, ‘Iraq:
Handling of WMD
Declaration’.
63
UN Press
Release, 19 December 2002, Statement
to press on Iraq inspections by Security Council
President
(SC/7614).
319