The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“We should
not underestimate the force of Iraqi nationalism … The divisions
and
loyalties
within Iraq are complex. Iraqi Shia are both Arabs and Iraqis: they
are
certainly
not Persians. The Persians are the historical enemy. I believe that
the
Iraqi
national identity is stronger and more rooted in shared experience
than many
pundits
think. Saddam Hussein has played on this sense of national pride –
Iraqis
used to be
nicknamed the ‘Prussians of the Middle East’ …”35
79.
Mr Fraser
advised that distrust of the US ran deep:
“For 35
years and more (even when the US was supporting Saddam) Iraqis
have
been pumped
full of propaganda that the US is hostile to Arabs and supports
Israel
and
Zionism. There is no doubt American policies towards Arab/Israel
generate
deep
hostility. Iraqis may long to be freed from Saddam Hussein, but
being liberated
by the
Americans will be deeply humiliating. I doubt, too, that they have
much
confidence
in what will come next. I cannot see how there would be much
appetite
for an
American-led Administration.”
80.
Attitudes to
the UK were described by Mr Fraser as “ambivalent”:
“As so
often with the former colonial power, it has been love-hate. As
recently as
the early
1980s Iraqi students were the most numerous group of overseas
students
in Britain.
But we have lost our contacts since then, and our siding with the
US
on
sanctions and NFZ [No-Fly Zone] policy over recent years,
culminating in this
campaign,
has presumably affected popular attitudes to Britain.”
81.
Mr Fraser
concluded that any overtly US-led administration would be
“untenable”
and Iraqis
“may find it deeply humiliating”. There would almost certainly be
attacks
on US
personnel. It was therefore “critically important that we continue
to press for
legitimisation
of interim and longer-term arrangements in Iraq through an
effective
UN
presence”. There was also “an even greater premium on a real change
of heart
in Washington
on the MEPP”.
82.
That presented
the UK with a dilemma over withdrawal:
“We will
need to stay to support a long term, viable political settlement in
Iraq
(and have
a clear idea of what that entails). Failure by us and the Americans
to see
through the
peace would compound the problem. But if the Americans insist on
the
sort of
model for Iraq that they currently seem to envisage, being closely
aligned with
them may
have political and security costs for us. Putting some distance
between us
and them,
where we can afford to, may be no bad thing.”
83.
Mr Straw’s
Private Office informed Mr Fraser on 1 May that Mr Straw had read
the
paper “and
kept it in his useful papers pack for the last several
weeks”.36
35
Minute
Fraser to McDonald, 31 March 2003, ‘Iraqi Attitudes to the
Americans and British’.
36
Note
McDonald, 1 May 2003, on Minute Fraser to McDonald, 31 March 2003,
‘Iraqi Attitudes to the
Americans
and British’.
144