6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
701.
Sir David
Manning advised Mr Blair:
“I am not
much persuaded … that if we help with the war fighting, we shall be
spared
the
post-conflict washing up. It didn’t work like that in Afghanistan.
Experience shows
that once
you are in, you’re in deep, without queues of grateful countries
waiting to
take over
when the shooting stops.”346
702.
Sir David
suggested that Mr Blair explore a number of questions with Mr
Hoon,
including:
“Can we afford Package 3?”
703.
Mr Edward
Oakden, Head of FCO Security Policy Department, advised Mr Straw
to
question
whether the decision really had to be made that
week.347
Mr Oakden
wrote that
the MOD’s
suggestion that the UK could trade a more active role in fighting
for “a smaller
military
role during reconstruction” seemed “optimistic”: “On the contrary,
if we have
fought
without international legal sanction, we could be left on our own
with the US.”
704.
On 16 October,
Mr Straw updated Mr Blair on his discussions with
Secretary
Powell on
14 and 15 October.348
He and
Secretary Powell had discussed the risks of
acting
without international backing and the problems of the “day after”
which would
be the
“largest and most hazardous exercise in nation-building”; it would
not be as
straightforward
as some thought.
705.
Mr Blair, Mr
Straw, Mr Hoon and Adm Boyce met on 17 October to discuss
military
options.349
Mr Blair
acknowledged the arguments in favour of Package 3,
but:
“… remained
concerned about costs. He concluded that he wanted to keep open
the
option of
Package 3. But we must not commit to it at this
stage.”
706.
Mr Campbell
wrote in his diaries that at the meeting, Mr Blair said “it was not
no,
but it was
not yet yes, and he wanted more work done analysing the
cost”.350
707.
The minutes of
the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff on 28 October stated
that
“it would
be important to emphasise within forthcoming submissions that,
although
Package 3
might be considered expensive, the alternative of committing to
ops
[operations]
during the aftermath would also require considerable
resources”.351
708.
Mr Blair, Mr
Straw, Mr Hoon and Adm Boyce discussed the MOD’s wish to
offer
Package 3
to the US for planning purposes on 31 October.352
Mr Blair
asked about the
additional
costs of Package 3 and whether they had been discussed with the
Treasury.
Adm Boyce
said that “he believed that if we made a major financial
contribution to the
346
Minute
Manning to Blair, 16 October 2002, ‘Iraq: UK Military
Options’.
347
Minute
Oakden to Private Secretary [FCO], 16 October 2002,
‘Iraq’.
348
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 16 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Powell: No US Interlocutors’.
349
Letter
Rycroft to Watkins, 17 October 2002, ‘Iraq: UK Military
Options’.
350
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
351
Minutes, 28
October 2002, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
352
Letter
Wechsberg to Watkins, 31 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Military
Options’.
231