The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
166.
On 29
January the US asked whether the UK would be prepared to take
the
lead on
restoring Iraq’s judicial system and police force in the two months
after
regime
change.
167.
The US also
requested that the UK help it “get to grips” with war
crimes.
168.
Mr Straw
instructed officials to help on judicial and police issues “as
much
as
possible”, but “on the basis of what is practical”.
169.
On 29 January,
Mr Peter Gooderham, Political Counsellor at the British
Embassy
Washington,
reported that the NSC had asked whether the UK, as one of the
Occupying
Powers,
would be willing to take lead responsibility for getting the Iraqi
judicial system
and police
“up and running within 60 days” of regime change, and whether
someone
from the UK
could spend a week in Washington to help “get to grips” with war
crimes.88
The US
would want the Coalition to deal with war crimes committed by
Iraqis during
hostilities,
but questions remained about prosecution of crimes from previous
conflicts.
The NSC had
been given two weeks to come up with answers.
170.
FCO officials
advised Mr Straw that two junior officials planned to visit
Washington
the
following week to develop a joint policy on war crimes with the US,
but that taking
lead
responsibility for the judicial system and the police would
be:
“… a
massive undertaking, with implications for the UK’s role as an
‘Occupying
Power’,
that should more properly be an international effort, mandated by
the UN.
So we shall
avoid getting drawn on this request.”89
171.
The FCO advice
was copied to the Cabinet Office, but not to any other
department.
172.
On 3 February,
Mr Straw instructed that the UK “should help the US on police
and
judicial
matters as much as possible”, but accepted that “this help has to
be on the basis
of what is
practical”.90
He
requested further advice after the next round of US/UK talks
on
post-conflict
issues.
173.
UK support for
SSR and judicial issues is addressed in Section 12.
174.
At the
trilateral UK/US/Australia UN working group on 5 February, the
US
rejected UK
compromise proposals for a hybrid governance structure in Iraq
that
might
satisfy US and UK views on the role of the UN.
88
Letter
Gooderham to Chaplin, 29 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Day After: US
Requests for Assistance on
Judicial Issues’.
89
Minute UND
[junior official] to Private Secretary [FCO], 31 January 2003,
‘Iraq the Day after – US
Requests
for Assistance on Judicial Issues’.
90
Minute [FCO
junior official] to UND [junior official], 3 February 2003, ‘Iraq
the Day after – US Request
for Assistance
on Judicial Issues’.
340