9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
636.
Mr Blair
told Cabinet on 18 December that the capture of Saddam
Hussein
should enable
more progress to be made in Iraq as it meant there was no focal
point
637.
Reflecting on
events in a telephone conversation with President Bush on the
same
day,
Mr Blair said that he saw the capture of Saddam Hussein as
“not the end, but the
beginning
of the end”.356
638.
Also on 18
December, Ambassador Bremer hosted a Campaign Review
meeting in
Baghdad – the first US/UK meeting to review strategy on Iraq –
attended by
senior civilian
and military representatives, including Lt Gen Fry, Mr Webb
and
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock.357
639.
Gen Abizaid
was reported to have commented on the importance of
withdrawing
as soon as
it was possible once the Iraqi Civil Defence Corps and Iraqi police
were in a
position to
assume control. In his view “many areas of MND(SE) were ‘almost
there’”.
640.
Lt Gen Fry
observed that it was:
“…
important for the Coalition to think strategically about deployment
of resources.
For example
the UK might consider re-deploying some personnel and assets
away
from
MND(SE) into either another geographical area or a function such as
training.”
641.
The record of
this meeting is the first time the Inquiry has seen a reference to
the
US plans to
restructure the Coalition military within Iraq. The new
Multi-National Force
HQ would be
headed by a four-star general, and Gen Abizaid hoped that it would
be
possible
for the UK to second a three-star general to serve as one of the
deputies.
642.
The discussion
also covered finalising a Security Agreement which would
allow
Coalition
Forces to operate after 1 July 2004. Negotiations were expected to
focus on
freedom of
action for US forces and on Iraqi forces operating under US
command.
643.
Ambassador
Bremer told those present that he had authorised US$400m for
job
creation
and essential services over the next six months, about half in
Sunni areas.
644.
On 19
December, Mr Sawers sent Mr Straw an ‘End of Term
Assessment’ on
Iraq, for
“holiday reflection” and to inform any conversations Mr Straw
might have with
Secretary
Powell over the Christmas period.358
355
Cabinet
Conclusions, 18 December 2003.
356
Letter
Cannon to Adams, 18 December 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s Conversation
with President Bush,
18 December’.
357
Teleletter
Greenstock to Adams, 19 December 2003, ‘US/UK Iraq Strategy Review
Meeting’.
358
Minute
Sawers to Foreign Secretary, 19 December 2003, ‘Iraq: End of Term
Assessment’.
313