9.1 |
March to 22 May 2003
101.
In preparation
for a meeting between Mr Blair and President Bush to be held
at
Hillsborough
Castle near Belfast, Mr Rycroft chaired talks between US and UK
officials
102.
The US team
was led by Mr John Bellinger, Legal Adviser to the National
Security
103.
Before the
talks, Mr Brenton wrote to Sir David Manning to provide “the
clearest
possible
view of where the Americans are”.50
Mr Brenton
said that clarity on that had
been
obscured by “intense Washington departmental infighting”, but he
suspected that
at the
talks:
“… key
areas of disagreement between us will boil down to how to ensure
the proper
balance
between external and internal Iraqis is [sic] the IIA, and
precisely what role
the UN will
play in putting the IIA together.”
104.
In Mr
Brenton’s opinion those were “important points but ought not to be
deal
breakers”.
105.
Mr Brenton
warned that the UK was in danger of being “left behind by events”
in
the
staffing of ORHA; lists of officials to shadow Iraqi Ministries
were almost complete,
and the UK
had not made a bid.
“Following
our significant military efforts we surely have an interest in
following
through to
the civilian phase. If so, given the advanced state of US
preparation, it will
be
important that we vigorously pursue the point …”
107.
In addition to
Mr Brenton’s advice, on 3 April the IPU provided Mr Rycroft with
a
minute
containing an annotated version of the agenda for the talks and a
commentary
on the
latest US draft resolution, which Mr Chilcott had just
seen.51
108.
The commentary
described the UK’s problems with the US draft as being that
it:
•
envisaged a
UN Special Co-ordinator with a limited role in creating the IIA,
which
would in
turn be subordinate to the Coalition;
•
implied
endorsement of military action, something the Security Council
was
unlikely to
agree;
•
lifted all
sanctions against Iraq without requiring WMD disarmament to
be
demonstrated;
and
•
placed oil
revenues under Coalition control.
48
Minute
Rycroft to Prime Minister, 4 April 2003, ‘Future of
Iraq’.
49
Minute
O’Brien to Private Secretary, 4 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Phase IV
Discussions’.
50
Letter
Brenton to Manning, 3 April 2003, ‘Post Conflict
Iraq’.
51
Minute
Chilcott to Rycroft, 3 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Phase IV: Meeting with US
Officials’ attaching Paper IPU,
[undated],
‘Comments on US draft Post conflict Iraq resolution’.
149