4.4 | The
search for WMD
be
addressed and highlight the intentions of the regime. There would
be no detailed
annexes.
Any annexes that had been prepared in his absence would be included
in the
final
report.
707.
Mr Howard
explained the wish at the highest political level in the UK for the
report
to include
as much detail as possible. He offered to host a seminar in London
bringing
together
experts from the ISG, London and Washington. Mr Duelfer was
not averse
to
including detail as long as there were no piecemeal conclusions,
and was fully
committed
to consulting capitals on the interim and final reports. He was not
attracted to
the idea of
a seminar.
708.
Mr Scarlett
advised Sir Nigel Sheinwald that getting “the right balance of
detail”
into the
next ISG report might not be as simple as the record of the video
conference
suggested.
He was pressing for immediate sight of the latest
draft.396
709.
Mr Scarlett
reported separately that, during a video conference on
2 March,
Mr Duelfer
had explained that he did not intend to share the draft of the next
interim
report with
capitals in advance, but was willing to discuss
detail.397
He had
emphasised
the
importance of the report being seen to be the independent work of
the ISG.
Mr Scarlett
and Mr Howard had stressed the importance of capturing some of
the
detail from
the September 2003 Interim Report, which underpinned public
statements.
They had
been invited to submit areas of the 2003 Interim Report they would
like
to see
reflected.
710.
The Op
ROCKINGHAM weekly update for 27 February to 4 March
reported
that the
ISG’s pace of operations could not be sustained in
March.398
Limiting
factors
included a
reduction in the number of already scarce interpreters and a
requirement to
train US
units arriving on troop rotation.
711.
In early
March, Mr Blair requested weekly updates on the
ISG.399
712.
During a video
conference on 2 March, Mr Scarlett stressed to
Mr Duelfer the
need for
his forthcoming report to capture some of the detail from the
September 2003
ISG Interim
Report.400
Mr Duelfer
invited Mr Scarlett to submit “nuggets” which the
UK
believed
were “relevant” to the forthcoming report.
713.
On
4 March, Mr Scarlett told Sir Nigel Sheinwald that
discussions with Mr Duelfer
would need
careful handling. Mr Duelfer had made it clear that he owned
the report and
would not
accept “joint drafting”. Mr Scarlett advised that, whatever
assurances were
received
from the US, the UK would have to work hard to avoid
“surprises”.
396
Manuscript
comment Scarlett to Sheinwald, 26 February 2004, on Minute
[DIS] to DCDI,
24 February 2004,
‘Iraq/ISG: Senior Level UK/US VTC 24 February
2004’.
397
Minute
Scarlett to Sheinwald, 4 March 2004, ‘Iraq: The ISG’ attaching
Paper [unattributed], [undated],
‘Iraq ISG
Issues’.
398
Op
ROCKINGHAM Weekly No.36, 27 February – 4 March
2004.
399
Minute
Scarlett to Sheinwald, 4 March 2004, ‘Iraq: The
ISG’.
400
Minute
Scarlett to Duelfer, 8 March 2004, ‘ISG Report’.
563